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I KNOW IT WHEN I SEIZE IT: SELECTED
PROBLEMS IN OBSCENITY
by Richard G. Hirsch* and
John L. Ryan**
freed-men undauntedly craveth knowledge Anon. c. 1527
I. INTRODUCTION
Concern over the burgeoning traffic in pornography has thrust upon
Congress and the courts the monumental task of determining the scope
of obscenity laws in the United States. In 1967 pursuant to a directive
of Congress' the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography was estab-
lished whose duties were stated as follows:
[T]o analyze the laws pertaining to the control of obscenity and por-
nography; and to evaluate and recommend definitions of obscenity
and pornography;
[T]o ascertain the methods employed in the distribution of obscene
and pornographic materials and to explore the nature and volume of
traffic in such materials;
[T]o study the effect of obscenity and pornography upon the public,
and particularly minors, and its relationship to crime and other anti-
social behavior; and
[T]o recommend such legislative, administrative, or other advisable
* Member of the California Bar; former Chief of the Pornography Section, Organized
Crime and Pornography Division, Office of the Los Angeles District Attorney.
** Executive Editor, Loyola University of Los Angeles Law Review. The authors
wish to express their gratitude to Adolph T. Brugger, without whose faith and confi-
dence this article would not have been possible. Further thanks to Claire Hirsch
whose monumental patience made one author available.
1 Act of Oct. 3, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-100, § 1, 81 Stat. 253, wherein the justifica-
tion for such a commission was stated:
The Congress finds that the traffic in obscenity and pornography is a matter of
national concern. The problem, however, is not one which can be solved at any
one level of government. The Federal Government has a responsibility to in-
vestigate the gravity of this situation and to determine whether such materials are
harmful to the public, and particularly to minors, and whether more effective
methods should be devised to control the transmission of such materials. The
State and local governments have an equal responsibility in the exercise of their
regulatory powers and any attempts to control this transmission should be a
coordinated effort at the various governmental levels. It is the purpose of this
Act to establish an advisory commission whose purpose shall be, after a thorough
study which shall include a study of the causal relationship of such materials to
antisocial behavior, to recommend advisable, appropriate, effective, and constitu-
tional means to deal effectively with such traffic in obscenity and pornography.
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and appropriate action as the Commission deems necessary to regulate
effectively the flow of such traffic, without in any way interfering with
constitutional rights.
2
The final report of the Commission indicated that the "national con-
cern ''4 was with the elimination of all restrictions in the traffic of ob-
scenity and pornography, insofar as consenting adults are concerned.
Congress, in an unprecedented move, voted overwhelmingly to cen-
sure its own Commission and to disregard its findings.5 The President
of the United States disavowed the findings of the Commission and de-
nied responsibility for its conclusions, indicating that it was formed dur-
ing a previous Administration." Although seemingly paradoxical, this
divergence of opinion is no less than that which is found in the deci-
sions of the federal and state courts.
It is not the purpose of this article to define "obscenity". Indeed
the courts have struggled to formulate such a definition for more than
a decade with a plethora of verbiage and a dearth of guidance. 7  Nei-
2 Id. § 5(a), 81 Stat. at 254.
3 THE REPORT OF TH COmm'N ON OBscENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970). This report
(No. 0-407-250) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov't
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
4 Act of Oct. 3, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-100, § 1, 81 Stat. 253.
5 S. Res. 477, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 17,903 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970).
6 6 WKLY Com,. PRESmENTAL Docs. 1454-55 (1970).
7 Commencing with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) through Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court have noted this problem. Justice Brennan, author of the majority opinion in
Roth, has conceded that the formulation of a definition of obscenity is "not perfect".
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). Justice Harlan has indicated that "the
central development that emerges from the aftermath of Roth v. United States ...is
that no stable approach to the obscenity problem has yet been devised by [the]
Court" and that the tests for obscenity were in a "tangled state of affairs". A Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455-56 (1966) (dissenting opinion) [hereinafter cited as
Memoirs v. Massachusetts]. Justice Harlan has more recently described the state of the
law as one of "utter bewilderment". Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,
707 (1967) (dissenting opinion); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)
(concurring opinion). Perhaps the most cogent expression of the difficulty in this
area was proferred by Justice Stewart, when he candidly asserted that the Court:
was faced with the task of trying to define what may be indefinable. I have
reached the conclusion . . . that . . . criminal laws in this area are constitutionally
limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define
[that kind of material] . . . . But I know it when I see it . . . . Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion) (footnotes omitted).
Justices Black and Douglas have adopted the view most recently expressed by the
Federal Commission on Obscenity and Pornography that there should be no restriction
upon dissemination among consenting adults. They would impose no restrictions upon
distribution on the theory that First Amendment guarantees are not qualified but are
an absolute right. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 652-53 (1968) (dissenting
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ther will this article undertake a determination of the extent of the
phrase "contemporary community standards",8 nor will it discuss the
opinion); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (dissenting opinion). See
also Teeter & Pember, The Retreat From Obscenity: Redrup v. New York, 21 HAsT.
L.J. 175 (1969); Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 SUP. CT. REv.
7 (1966); cf. Dibble, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 S. CAL.
L. REv. 345 (1966).
8 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957); In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563,
572-73, 446 P.2d 535, 541-42, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 661-62 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
910 (1969); CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311 (West 1970). The "contemporary com-
munity standard" ranges from national (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Ex-
cellent Publications, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1962); Palladino v.
McBrine, 310 F. Supp. 308 (D. Mass. 1970); State v. Hudson County News Co., 41
N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963)) through statewide (In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563,
446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655; McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 134, 121 N.W.
2d 545 (1963)) to, inferentially at least, a local standard (Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957); Gent v. State, 239 Ark. 474, 393 S.W.2d 219 (1965), rev'd on other
grounds, sub nom., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)). In Roth, the trial
judge instructed the jury:
"... the test is whether it would arouse sexual desires or sexual impure
thoughts in those comprising a particular segment of the community, the young,
the immature or the highly prudish or would leave another segment, the scientific
or highly educated or the so-called worldly-wise and sophisticated indifferent and
unmoved....
"The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered
as a whole, not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to
reach. In other words, you determine its impact upon the average person in the
community. The books, pictures and circulars must be judged as a whole, in their
entire context, and you are not to consider detached or separate portions in
reaching a conclusion. You judge the circulars, pictures and publications which
have been put in evidence by present-day standards of the community. You
may ask yourselves does it offend the common conscience of the community by
present-day standards.
"In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are the exclu-
sive judges of what the common conscience of the community is, and in deter-
mining that conscience you are to consider the community as a whole, young and
old, educated and uneducated, the religious and the irreligious-men, women and
children." 354 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
Indeed, two Justices have spoken in favor of a localized standard:
It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to be defined
by reference to "community standards," it meant community standards-not a
national standard, as is sometimes argued. I believe that there is no provable
"national standard," and perhaps there should be none. At all events, this
Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would be unreasonable to expect
local courts to divine one. It is said that such a "community" approach may well
result in material being proscribed as obscene in one community but not in an-
other, and, in all probability, that is true. But communities throughout the Nation
are in fact diverse, and it must be remembered that, in cases such as this one, the
Court is confronted with the task of reconciling conflicting rights of the diverse
communities within our society and of individuals. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 200-01 (1964) (Warren, C.J., & Clark, J., dissenting).
It should be noted that Roth was joined for decision with Alberts v. California. Roth
dealt with the constitutionality of a federal obscenity statute (18 U.S.C. § 1461
(1964)) whereas Alberts considered a state obscenity statute (CAL. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 311 (West 1970)). While it is arguable that Roth involves a federal standard and,
therefore, a national test, it seems inferrable from the aforementioned instruction that
the test to be applied is that of the locale from which the jury is impanelled.
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sociological and psychological aspects of "appeal to the prurient in-
terest"Y
Attention will be focused upon three areas of obscenity law which,
due to the unique nature of First Amendment rights, raise grave doubts
as to whether traditional concepts of criminal procedure should apply.
Does the general rule that the prosecution must affirmatively plead
and prove all elements of a criminal case apply to the "redeeming so-
cial value" standard as set forth in A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachu-
setts (Memoirs)?10 Must there be a prior judicial determination on the
issue of obscenity before the search for or seizure of allegedly obscene
material is undertaken? Assuming such a determination is necessary,
is there a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion when the court orders the individual to produce a copy of the ques-
tioned material for use by the prosecution in a subsequent criminal
proceeding? Are the concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel
available to either party in obscenity cases involving a subsequent action
concerning the identical material? The quest for the answers to these
questions, if indeed answers exist, is one which the courts and the pro-
fession are currently pursuing.
U1. REDEEMING SOCIAL IMPORTANCE
A. Historical Development
It will be useful, as a preface to the discussion of burden of proof, to
trace the development of the "redeeming social importance" test. The
test first appeared as dicta in the landmark case of Roth v. United
States." Justice Brennan, for the majority, stated:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment
is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance. (emphasis added) 12
9 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
10 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); see CAL. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 311 (West 1970). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); CAL. Evin.
CODE § 115 (West 1968) (burden of proof); CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1096 (West 1970)
(presumption of innocence).
11 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12 Id. at 484 (footnote omitted). This was the first occasion that a consideration
of redemptive qualities had been given in applying the then two part test of obscenity,
[Vol. 4
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The importance of the "redeeming social importance" test was later
clarified by dicta in Jacobellis v. Ohio.13 Justice Brennan, again for
the majority, said:
We would reiterate, however, our recognition in Roth that obscenity
is excluded from the constitutional protection only because it is "utterly
without redeeming social importance," and that "the portrayal of sex,
e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason
to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press." It follows that material dealing with sex in a manner that advo-
cates ideas, or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other
form of social importance, may not be branded as obscenity and de-
nied the constitutional protection.
14
A tripartite test of obscenity was finally enunciated by the Court in
Memoirs.15  The Court noted that the Roth test of obscenity,
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to the prurient interest,"'16 had been elaborated in subsequent cases
and that:
[T]hree elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or rep-
resentation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without
redeeming social value." (emphasis added) 17
namely, "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest."
Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).
13 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
14 Id. at 191 (citations and footnote omitted). Shortly thereafter, Justice Brennan
reiterated the view of the Court in a speech delivered to the Harvard School of Law:
Judges have struggled for many decades to frame an adequate standard; the
standard so far evolved withholds protection only from material that portrays sex
in a way that justifies treating the material as utterly without redeeming social
importance. The line between protected and unprotected portrayal is dim and
uncertain, and judges do experience great difficulty in marking it. Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARv. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1965).
15 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
16 354 U.S. at 489.
17 383 U.S. at 418. It is interesting to note that the Court has used "redeeming
social importance" and "redeeming social value" when considering obscenity cases.
It is at least arguable that material may have some "social value", however slight, yet
be of no "social importance". An analysis of the language in Memoirs, set out below,
poses an interesting question. The decision states:
Each of the three federal constitutional criteria is to be applied independently; the
social value of the book can neither be weighed against nor cancelled by its
prurient appeal or patent offensiveness. ...
Evidence that the book was commercially exploited for the sake of prurient appeal,
19711
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The adoption of this view was not without criticism. In separate dis-
sents' s Justices Clark and White expressed their belief that the Court
had engrafted a new criterion upon the Roth test. In addition Mr.
Justice White felt that "'social importance' is not an independent test
of obscenity but is relevant only to determining the predominant pruri-
ent interest of the material. .... 1
This tripartite test has most recently been recognized and applied as an
absolute constitutional requirement in Stein v. Batchelor.2 ° In Stein
the publisher of a "bi-weekly underground" publication entitled Dallas
Notes brought a civil rights action pursuant to the provisions of the
United States Code" on behalf of himself and a class composed of per-
sons similarly situated. He alleged that he was being harassed and
sought injunctive relief from future arrest and indictment, declaratory
relief on the ground that the section of the Texas Penal Code22 under
which he was being prosecuted was unconstitutional, and injunctive
relief from future seizure of property without a prior determination of
obscenity.
23
Stein alleged that the statute was violative of constitutional guar-
antees in that it prohibited the mere possession of obscene material; that
it was an overbroad regulation of expression since it failed to delineate
to the exclusion of all other values, might justify the conclusion that the book was
utterly without redeeming social importance. Id. at 419-20 (footnote omitted).
It seems a logical extension of the foregoing to assume that "social value" is of lesser
stature (being one element of a number of "values" which coalesce within the designa-
tion "social importance") and therefore not equivalent with "social importance".
18 Id. at 460-61 (dissenting opinion).
19 Id. at 462 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
20 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (3 judge court), prob. iuirs, noted, 396 U.S.
954 (1969).
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1964).
22 Article 527 of the Texas Penal Code was cited by the court, in pertinent part,
as follows:
Section 1. Whoever shall knowingly ... have in his possession or under his
control, or otherwise distribute, make, display, or exhibit any obscene [material]
...[shall be subject to prosecution].
Section 3. For purposes of this article the word "obscene" is defined as whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme ot the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests. Provided,
further for the purpose of this article, the term "contemporary community
standards" shall in no case involve a territory or geographic area less than the
State of Texas.
Section 5 ... The provisions of the Act shall not apply to any daily or
weekly newspaper. 301 F. Supp. at 603 n.1.
One day later the article was amended, inter alia, to incorporate the tripartite test set
forth in Memoirs. Ch. 468, §'1, [1969J Tex. Laws 61st Leg. 1547.
23 300 F. Supp. at 663-04.
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the tripartite test of Memoirs, relying instead upon the earlier Roth test;
and that a provision exempting publications with daily or weekly distri-
bution was violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court granted injunctive and declaratory relief but
did not reach the issue of harassment since it did not involve an attack
on the constitutionality of a statute and was therefore not the subject
for a three judge court.24 Rather, it held that the statute was unconsti-
tutional as an overbroad regulation of expression because it omitted the
language "utterly without redeeming social value".25
B. California Approach
1. Evidentiary Aspects
California has also enacted a statute defining obscenity, 26 but it
substantially follows the requirements set forth in Memoirs.
7
24 Id. at 604.
25 The court stated:
It is clear to us that the Supreme Court in Memoirs has added to the definition
per se, of "obscene" in the Roth case by including in it the provision that to be
"obscene" material must be "utterly without redeeming social value." Thus with-
out such inclusion the Texas statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 608 (emphasis
added).
The court sidestepped the issue of the necessity for a prior determination of ob-
scenity before seizure of materials on the grounds that, within the language of the
existing statute, there was adequate provision for constitutionally permissible procedures.
Nor did the court discuss the Equal Protection argument concerning the exemption of
daily and weekly publications. In ruling upon the proscription of mere possession of
obscene material, the court relied upon the recent decision of Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), wherein it was held that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime." Id. at 568.
The Stein court found the provisions of the Texas statute to be so interrelated as to
be unseverable. The entire statute was held to be unconstitutional as it failed to "con-
fine its application to a context of public or commercial dissemination." 300 F. Supp.
at 607. On appeal to the Supreme Court, probable jurisdiction has been noted (396
U.S. 954 (1969)), and among the issues to be considered is whether "the redeeming
social value standard must be affirmatively pleaded and proved by the prosecution in
obscenity cases." 6 CmGm. L. REP. 4085 (1969). There are two federal district cases
which express a view diametrically opposed to Stein concerning the stature of "utterly
without redeeming social importance." Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich,
304 F. Supp. 662, 668 (E.D. La. 1969), prob. juris noted, sub nom., Perez v. Ledesma,
399 U.S. 924 (1970), and Cambist Films, Inc. v. Tribell, 293 F. Supp. 407, 410 (E.D.
Ky. 1968) state that in listing the three elements enumerated in Memoirs, Justice Bren-
nan was not making additional requirements but was merely explaining the Roth test.
26 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311 (West 1970). An excellent discussion of the legis-
lative history of the statute is found in Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 918-20,
383 P.2d 152, 164-65, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 812-13 (1963).
27 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311(a) (West 1970), in pertinent part, is as follows:
"Obscene matter" means matter, taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which
to the average person, applying contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i.e.,
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In California a judicial requirement had been established by In re
Giannini s that the prosecution must introduce evidence that "[when]
applying contemporary community standards, the [material] appealed
to the prurient interest of the audience and affronted the standards of
decency accepted in the community."29  By "evidence" the court indi-
cated that it meant "expert testimony". 30 After noting a conflict of au-
thorities on the manner in which community standards are to be proven,
the court resolved the dilemma, stating:
We cannot assume that jurors in themselves necessarily express or
reflect community standards; we must achieve so far as possible the ap-
plication of an objective, rather than a subjective, determination of
community standards. . . . [T]he determination of obscenity is for
juror or judge not on the basis of his personal upbringing or restricted
reflection or particular experience of life, but on the basis of "con-
temporary community standards". 31
In 1969 the California Legislature attempted to obviate the strict
mandate of Giannini through the enactment of Penal Code section
312.1 which provides:
In any prosecution for a violation of the [obscenity or "harmful mat-
ter" laws] neither the prosecution nor the defense shall be required to
introduce expert witness testimony concerning the obscene or harmful
character of the matter which is the subject of any such prosecution.
Any evidence which tends to establish contemporary community stand-
ards of appeal to prurient interest or of customary limits of candor in
the description or representation of nudity, sex or excretion, or which
bears upon the question of redeeming social importance, shall, subject
to the provisions of the Evidence Code, be admissible when offered by
a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is matter which
taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in descrip-
tion or representation of such matters; and is matter which taken as a whole is
utterly without redeeming social importance.
It may be noted that the language of this statute is susceptible to the "value-import-
ance" distinction mentioned in note 17 supra.
28 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
910 (1969). This case deals primarily with the term "contemporary community
standards", and establishes that the term is a qualifying factor in determining whether
the "predominant appeal" is to the prurient interest and whether the material is beyond
the "customary limits of candor".
29 Id. at 567, 446 P.2d at 538, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
30 Id. at 574, 446 P.2d at 543, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
31 Id. at 574-75, 446, P.2d 543-44, 72 Cal. Rptr. 663-64 (citations and footnotes
omitted). The court notes, in footnote 8, that some courts follow a general rule that
certain "expressions" may be so patently obscene as to obviate proof of the community
standard; however, the court did not undertake to rule whether California has adopted
this approach.
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either the prosecution or by the defense. (emphasis added) 32
Although the statute states that expert testimony is not required in an
obscenity prosecution and that "any evidence" will suffice, it is sub-
mitted that only expert testimony will be relevant, material, competent
and therefore admissible. It is difficult to imagine what type of "non-
expert" evidence could be offered on the issue of "contemporary com-
munity standards". Any witness who testifies concerning any standard
seems, at least inferentially, to assume the role of "expert". Despite
the mandate of the Legislature, the logic of Giannini, concerning the
subjective opinion of judge and jury, cannot be disregarded. If the trier
of fact is not allowed to temper its judgment based upon its own empiri-
cal knowledge, it should not be permitted to rely upon the empirical
knowledge of one similarly situated. If it did, the standard before the
trier of fact would be the subjective standard of the witness. Given the
mandate of Roth and its subsequent development, any witness who
undertakes to testify concerning "contemporary community standards",
may do so only after an appropriate foundation is laid or else the testi-
mony, no matter how relevant and material, will be incompetent.
33
Perhaps evidence of a survey of contemporary attitudes could be offered,
rather than the testimony of witnesses. For such a survey to be compe-
tent it would be necessary to establish that it was prepared by qualified
personnel adhering to procedures which would assure the accuracy
of the proffered results. But again, an "expert" would be required to
attest to these facts. The legislative enactment which obviated the Gi-
annini requirement of expert testimony was an exercise in futility. By
its very nature, an obscenity prosecution in California, which requires
proof of a statewide 4 "contemporary community standard", necessi-
tates expert testimony due to the uniqueness of the test.
The holding in Giannini seems to establish clearly that the prose-
cution in California, at the very least, bears the burden of proving con-
temporary community standards of the customary limits of candor and
appeal to prurient interest. The decision was silent as to which party
bears the burden of proving "redeeming social importance"' 35 and, to
32 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 312.1 (West 1970). Government agencies and the
American Civil Liberties Union supported passage, since both considered the burden
and expense of producing expert testimony prohibitive.
33 See generally Comment, Expert Testimony in Obscenity Cases, 18 HAST. L.i. 161
(1966).
34 In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968).
35 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311(a)(2) (West 1970). The only reference to this
burden is in a note appended to the decision wherein the court states:
Petitioners do not so much as claim that their convictions should be set aside on
1971]
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date, People v. Newton36 (Appellate Department of the Los Angeles
Superior Court) is the only occasion a California court has been called
upon to decide this issue.37 After a discussion of the qualifications of an
expert witness the court continued:
[Alppellants would have the People's expert start in a void and prove a
negative. The trial court found and the testimony supports the finding
that the dances here involved predominately appealed to the prurient
interest and exceeded customary limits of candor. It is hard to con-
ceive, althouigh admittedly it is possible, that such material could have
redeeming social value. While the burden of persuasion as to lack of
redeeming social value is on the prosecution, where the other elements
of obscenity exist the burden of going forward should be, and we feel is
on the defendant.38
Therefore once the prosecution has proven, when applying contemporary
community standards, that the material in question predominantly ap-
peals to the prurient interest and exceeds customary limits of candor it
has established that the material is obscene. Barring another defense
(e.g., lack of scienter), a conviction must follow unless the defendant
produces evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable doubt as to the
lack of redeeming social importance. The clear import of this decision
is that it emasculates the tripartite test of Memoirs and the California
Penal Code, as well as provisions relating to the presumption of inno-
cence, 39 burden of producing evidence, 40 and burden of proof.41
2. Burden of Proof
In California, "burden of proof" is defined as "the obligation of a
party to establish by evidence a requisite degree of belief concerning a
fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the court.' ' 42 This burden gener-
the ground of the "redeeming social value" of (the] dance. Thus we do not reach
the problem of whether the dance was "utterly without redeeming social value"
and we certainly do not hold that it met that test. 69 Cal. 2d at 573 n.5, 446
P.2d at 542 n.5, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 662 n.5.
While the Penal Code requires "importance", the court speaks of "value", apparently
treating the terms as equivalent. See note 17 supra.
36 9 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 24, 88 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1970).
3a Appellant Newton, and others, appealed from a judgment in which they were found
guilty of violating CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 314 (West 1970) (indecent exposure). The
People's principal witness was qualified by the court as an "expert" concerning appeal
to the prurient interest and limits of candor, applying contemporary community stand-
ards. 9 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 26-27, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
38 Id. at 27-28, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
39 CAL. EvID. CODE § 501 (West 1968); CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1096 (West 1970).
40 CAL. Evm. CODE H9 115, 500-02, 520 (West 1968).
41 Id. §§ 110, 550.
42 Id. § 115.
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ally falls upon the party who must establish the existence or nonexistence
of each fact "which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he
is asserting. '43  It is further provided that "[tihe party claiming that a
person is guilty of crime or wrongdoing has the burden of proof on
that issue."44 The burden of producing evidence, i.e., the burden of go-
ing forward, is generally construed in pari materia with the burden of
proof. The Evidence Code provides:
(a) The burden of producing evidence as to a particular fact is on the
party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the
absence of further evidence.
(b) The burden of producing evidence as to a particular fact is initially
on the party with the burden of proof as to that fact.
45
The Evidence Code further defines the burden of producing evidence
to be "the obligation of a party to introduce evidence sufficient to avoid
a ruling against him on the issue.""
Although the state generally has the burden of proving the guilt of a
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt,47 on occasion the defendant must
bear the burden of producing evidence.48 This occurs when the defend-
ant has information peculiarly within his knowledge which would negate
evidence otherwise tending to establish his guilt. The background and
development of this concept is as varied as it is informative. An exami-
nation of selected cases in this area may be of interest at this time.
During the Prohibition Era the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered a case involving a violation of the Internal Revenue Act which
provided that one carrying on the business of a distiller must first
execute a bond.40  No affirmative proof was presented by the prosecu-
tion that a bond was not executed. The Court nevertheless held that
the failure of the defendant to give such a bond could be inferred:
[I]t is not incumbent on the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to
support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by es-
tablished circumstances and which if untrue could be readily disproved
by the production of documents or other evidence probably within the
defendant's possession or control.50
43 Id. § 500.
44 Id. § 520.
45 Id. § 550.
46 Id. § 110.
47 Id. § 501; CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1096 (West 1970).
48 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
49 Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89 (1933),
Go Id. at 91-92. While the Court uses the term "burden of proof", it is discussing
"burden of producing evidence" as the term is used in the California Evidence Code.
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This exception has also been recognized by the California courts in
certain factual situations. In People v. Boo Doo Hong,51 the defendant
was charged with practicing medicine without a certificate. The trial
court instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of proving
that he had such a certificate and absent this proof "it must be taken
as true that he had not procured a certificate to so practice medi-
cine." 52  On this instruction the California Supreme Court ruled:
Tihere is a well recognized exception . . . where there is a negative
averment of a fact which is peculiarly within the knowledge of the de-
fendant. . . Such is the case in civil or criminal prosecutions for a
penalty for doing an act which the statutes do not permit to be done by
any persons, except those who are duly licensed therefor. . . exercising
a trade or profession, and the like. Here the party, if licensed, can im-
mediately show it without the least inconvenience; whereas, if proof of
the negative were required, the inconvenience would be very great.
53
In People v. Osaki54 a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the Alien
Land Law, 5 which provided that ineligible aliens were precluded from
enjoying any benefits in real property, there was a specific provision
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant upon an allegation that he
was a member of a race ineligible for citizenship.6  Upon conviction
the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the law, on the ground
that alienage was a substantive element of the offense and that the bur-
den of proof could not be shifted from the prosecution merely by a nega-
tive allegation in the indictment. The court held there was no viola-
tion of due process in requiring the defendant to prove his eligibility,
7
and noted futher that judicial approval had been given to similar provi-
sions even without statutory authorization. 8 The general rule was
stated to be "when the negative of an issue does not permit direct proof
or where the facts come more immediately within the knowledge of the
defendant, the onus probandi rests upon him."59 The court noted that
this was merely a reiteration of a common law rule which has come to
51 122 Cal. 606, 55 P. 402 (1898).
52 Id. at 607, 55 P. at 403.
53 Id. at 608, 55 P. at 403.
54 209 Cal. 169, 286 P. 1025 (1930).
65 [1921) Cal. Stat. lxxxvii (enacted by voters 1920), as amended, ch. 441, § 1,
[1923) Cal. Stat. 1020 [repealed ch. 316, §§ 1-5, [1955] Cal. Stat. 767-68; ch. 550,
§ 1, [19551 Cal. Stat. 2831]; ch. 244, § 1, [1927] Cal. Stat. 434 (enactment of COD13
CIrv. PROC. § 1983) [repealed ch. 299, § 117, [19651 Cal. Stat. 1297, 1363].
56 Id.
57 209 Cal. 169, 188, 286 P. 1025, 1032 (1930).
58 Id. at 176, 286 P. at 1027.
59 Id.
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be known as the "rule of convenience!'.6
The "rule of convenience" is commonly applied in cases involving the
use and possession of narcotics and restricted dangerous drugs. In
cases involving the use of narcotics the rule is codified. 61 With respect
to cases involving possession,6" sale, furnishing and importing63 of any
narcotic, other than marijuana, and the possession,64 sale, furnishing
and importing65 of any restricted dangerous drug, cases6 6 have held
the rule to be applicable to the negative averment "except upon the
prescription of a physician, dentist, podiatrist or veterinarian licensed to
practice in this state."
67
No exception is taken with either the aforementioned rule as ap-
plied in the situations enumerated or its theoretical basis, which has
been stated: "in respect to negative allegations. . . the burden of proof
shall rest on the party, who holds the affirmative; and especially where
the facts are peculiarly within his privity and cognizance. ... 68 It
seems obvious that were this burden to be placed upon the prosecution
it would create a nearly insurmountable obstacle, unduly hampering
the efficient administration of justice. However, the policy considera-
tions which compel the application of the rule in the aforementioned
situations cannot be said to exist in the area of First Amendment rights,
particularly with respect to freedom of speech. While there has been
no case specifically dealing with the issue of negative averments in the
area of obscenity, the sensitive nature of First Amendment rights is well
delineated in the leading case of Speiser v. Randall,69 which dealt with
a California provision7" requiring one seeking a veteran's property tax
exemption to first sign a loyalty oath. In overruling the California Su-
60 Id. at 184, 286 P. at 1030.
61 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11721 (West 1964).
62 Id. § 11500.
63 Id. § 11501.
64 Id. § 11910 (West Supp. 1970).
65 Id. § 11912.
66 E.g., People v. Marschalk, 206 Cal. App. 2d 346, 23 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1962)
(privilege of possessing must be established by defense); People v. Harmon, 89 Cal.
App. 2d 55, 200 P.2d 32 (1948) (failure of proof of prescription establishes presump-
tion of non-existence); People v. Bill, 140 Cal. App, 389, 35 P.2d 645 (1934) (pre-
scription peculiarly within knowledge of defense).
67 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. H§ 11500, 11501 (West 1964); Id. 09 11910,
11912 (West Supp. 1970).
68 People v. Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 180, 286 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1930), quoting United
States v. Hayward, 26 F. Cas. 240 (No. 15,336) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
69 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
70 CAL. REV. & TAX CODE ANN. § 32 (West 1970).
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preme Court, which upheld denial of the exemption solely on the refusal
to execute the oath71 the United States Supreme Court held, "the denial
of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have
the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed
speech."72  After emphasizing the uniqueness of the cases which deal
with freedom of speech, the Court stated:
It is of course within the power of the State to regulate procedures un-
der which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evi-
dence and the burden of persuasion, "unless in so doing it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." . . . Of course, the burden of
going forward with the evidence at some stages of a criminal trial may
be placed on the defendant, but only after the State has "proved enough
to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been
proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of
convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the
burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the
accused to hardship or oppression.173
Considering the mandate of the tripartite test of obscenity set forth
in Memoirs,7 4 recently reiterated in Stein v. Batchelor,75 and reinforced
by statute in California,76 there is absolutely no justification for ap-
plying a "rule of convenience" which relieves the prosecution of af-
firmatively alleging and proving an indispensible element merely be-
cause of the negative nature of the averment. There seems nothing pe-
culiarly within the knowledge of the defendant concerning "redeeming
social importance" that is not equally within the knowledge of the prose-
cution. Furthermore, the usual situation in which the rule is invoked
does not require proof concerning a substantive element of the offense.
Permitting the burden of producing evidence to be shifted to the de-
fense in these matters is patently offensive to the underlying principles
of freedom of speech and the presumption of innocence. The prosecu-
tion simply has not "proved enough to make it just for the defendant
to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explana-
tion."17  Such an approach may inhibit an individual's exercise of free
71 Prince v. San Francisco, 48 Cal. 2d 472, 311 P.2d 544 (1957), citing First
Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311 P.2d 508 (1957).
72 357 U.S. at 519.
73 Id. at 523-24 (citations omitted).
74 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
75 300 F. Supp. 602, 607 (N.D. Tex. 1969), prob. juris noted, 396 U.S. 954 (1969).
76 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 311 (West 1970).
77 357 U.S. at 524.
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speech and serve as a prior restraint on this constitutional right. As was
noted in Speiser, "the man who knows that he must bring forth proof
and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must
steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these
burdens.
'78
Although the reader may feel that undue emphasis has earlier been
given to People v. Newton,79 a decision of the Appellate Department of
the Superior Court, it should be noted that the practical consequences
are grave indeed. At present, in excess of 2,000 obscenity prosecutions
are pending throughout Los Angeles County.80  Virtually all of these
will be tried in the Municipal Courts, upon which Newton is binding. Of
the cases to be tried in the Superior Court, Newton will be persuasive
authority. Furthermore, since this is the only case that has recently con-
sidered the matter, it may serve as authority throughout the State of
California.
Nearly a century ago, the United States Supreme Court eloquently set
forth the role of the prosecution in a criminal action:
Strictly speaking, the burden of proof, as those words are understood
in criminal law, is never upon the accused to establish his innocence or
to disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime for which he is in-
dicted. It is on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the
trial and applies to every element necessary to constitute the crime. 81
The prosecution should be required to affirmatively plead and prove all
elements of its case, including "redeeming social importance".
Ill. PRIOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF OBSCENITY
The concept of an adversary proceeding is one of the cornerstones of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. However, the extension of the adver-
sary hearing concept to proceedings prior to search or seizure is an
innovation unique to matters involving the First Amendment. Pres-
ently a conflict exists between the state and federal courts as to the
necessity of a prior adversary hearing. Those courts which hold such a
78 Id. at 526.
79 9 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 24, 88 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1970).
80 Sheldon Willens, Head of Pornography Section, Organized Crime and Pornogra-
phy Division, Office of the District Attorney, Los Angeles County.
81 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487 (1895). See also Lillianthal's Tobacco
v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266 (1877):
In criminal cases the true rule is that the burden of proof never shifts; that in all
cases, before a conviction can be had, the jury must be satisfied from the evidence,
beyond reasonable doubt, of the affirmative of the issue presented in the accusation
that the defendant is guilty in the manner and form as charged in the indictment.
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requirement to be of constitutional dimension adhere to the view that
without such a proceeding there exists a substantial risk of an imper-
missible prior restraint."2 Those courts holding to the contrary do so
pursuant to state procedures which provide for a speedy determination
of the issue of obscenity. 3 It should not be assumed that a single issue
is the basis for this divergence of opinion, for even those courts which
require a prior adversary hearing may feel that it is unnecessary un-
der certain circumstances.
8 4
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions
The United States Supreme Court has considered the issue of whether
an adversary proceeding is required prior to seizure of allegedly obscene
materials and it may reasonably be inferred from its decisions that such
a proceeding is required. In tracing the development of the adversary
hearing it must be borne in mind that the foundation for requiring such
a proceeding was the Court's early concern with impermissible prior re-
82 See, e.g., A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964);
Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon,
426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan, 420 F.2d 687 (3d Cir.
1969); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Calm, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Platt Amusement Arcade, Inc. v. Joyce, 316 F. Supp. 298
(W.D. Pa. 1970); Newman v. Conover, 313 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Tex. 1970); City
News Center, Inc. v. Carson, 310 F. Supp. 1018 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Gable v. Jenkins,
309 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969), a!f'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 592 (1970); Abrams &
Parisi, Inc. v. Canale, 309 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D. Tenn. 1969); Morrison v. Wilson,
307 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Fla. 1969) (3 judge court); H.M.H. Publishing Co., Inc. v.
Oldham, 306 F. Supp. 495 (M.D. Fla. 1969); May v. Harper, 306 F. Supp. 1222
(N.D. Fla. 1969); Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969) (3 judge
court); Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 305 F. Supp. 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Drive-In
Theatres, Inc. v. Huskey, 305 F. Supp. 1232 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Leslie Tobin Imports,
Inc. v. Rizzo, 305 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cron-
vich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969) (3 judge court); Fontaine v. Dial, 303 F. Supp.
436 (W.D. Tex. 1969) (3 judge court); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Tribell, 293 F. Supp. 407
(E.D. Ky. 1968); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968);
Poulos v. Rucker, 288 F. Supp. 305 (M.D. Ala. 1968); United States v. Brown, 274 F.
Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
83 See, e.g., A B C Books, Inc. v. Benson, 315 F. Supp. 695 (M.D. Tenn. 1970);
Hosey v. City of Jackson, 309 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (3 judge court); Rage
Books v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 546 .(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Monica Theater v. Municipal
Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1970); People v. de Renzy, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969); People v. Steinberg, 60 Misc. 2d 1041,
304 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Cty Ct. 1969); South Fla. Art Theatres, Inc. v. State ex rel. Mounts,
224 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
84 See United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969); Bethview Amusement
Corp. v. Calm, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir'. 1969); Bazzell v. Gibbens, 306 F. Supp. 1057
(E.D. La. 1969); Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D.
La. 1969).
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straints8 5  In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 6 the Court struck down, as a
prior restraint, a city ordinance which prohibited the distribution of
"circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind ' 87 without
first obtaining a permit. In discussing the concept of prior restraint,
the Court alluded to its historical basis, stating:
The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against
the power of the licensor. . . . [T]he liberty of the press became ini-
tially a right to publish "without a license what formerly could be pub-
lished only with one." While this freedom from previous restraint upon
publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty,
the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of
the constitutional provision.8
Lovell relied heavily upon the earlier case of Near v. Minnesota,9 even
though Lovell dealt with materials at the post-publication stage (but
prior to dissemination) and Near involved pre-publication restraint. The
language in Near may, at least inferentially, serve as the basis for the
requirement of a prior adversary hearing:
The recognition of authority to impose previous restraint upon publica-
tion in order to protect the community against the circulation of charges
of misconduct ...necessarily would carry with it the admission of the
authority of the censor against which the constitutional barrier was
erected. The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its
existence, does not depend, as this court has said, on proof of truth.90
In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,91 a divided court upheld a New York
statute which provided for enjoining the dissemination of obscene ma-
terials.9 2  The statute entitled the individual enjoined "a trial of the
issues within one day . . . and a decision . . .by the court within
two days of the conclusion of the trial."9 3  The Court noted that, un-
like Near, the instant case dealt with the issue of obscenity and the
challenged statute withheld "restraint upon matters not already pub-
lished and not yet found to be offensive. ''4  The dissenting Justices 5
85 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). It is beyond the
scope of this article to undertake an exhaustive analysis of prior restraints.
80 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
87 Id. at 447.
88 Id. at 451-52 (footnote omitted).
89 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
90 Id. at 721.
91 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (5-4 decision).
92 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. § 22-a (McKinney 1958).
93 Id. § 22-a(2).
94 354 U.S. at 445.
9G Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan and Justice Douglas (with whom Justice
Black joined) each wrote separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 445-48.
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urged that a prior judicial determination of obscenity was a constitu-
tional necessity. One Justice seemed to believe that an ex parte
procedure would suffice,96 whereas three Justices indicated that an
adversary proceeding is required.97 Two of these three Justices stated:
[iThe provision for an injunction pendente lite gives the State the
paralyzing power of a censor. A decree can issue ex parte-without a
hearing and without any ruling or finding on the issue of obscenity.
This provision is defended on the ground that it is only a little encroach-
ment, that a hearing must be promptly given and a finding of ob-
scenity promptly made. But every publisher knows what awful effect
a decree issued in secret can have. We tread here on First Amendment
grounds. And nothing is more devastating to the rights that it guarantees
than the power to restrain publication before even a hearing is held.
This is prior restraint and censorship at its worst. 8
The view of the dissent in Kingsley, which advocated the necessity
for a prior adversary hearing, began to receive a somewhat qualified
acceptance in Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property.9 Marcus in-
volved a Missouri procedure wherein a warrant for the search and seiz-
ure of obscene material could issue solely on the sworn statement of a
police officer. There was no provision for an adversary proceeding
prior to issuance of the warrant, however such a proceeding was re-
quired "not less than five nor more than 20 days after the seizure"' 00
and prior to destruction of the material. But no time limit was imposed
in which a judge had to render a decision. Search warrants were issued
directing the police to seize "obscene materials'' ° without the magis-
trate having viewed any of the suspect matter. All materials were
taken which the police believed to be obscene. This resulted in the seiz-
ure of approximately 11,000 copies of 280 publications.102  Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, found that aside from the fact that peti-
tioners were not afforded an opportunity to contest the propriety of the
96 Id. at 445 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 446-48 (Black & Douglas, J.J., dissenting and Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 446 (Black & Douglas, J.J., dissenting). The Court acknowledges the
unique and delicate nature of First Amendment rights and the need for vigilance con-
cerning intrusion. This attitude was clearly expressed the following year in Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), wherein Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated,
"the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legiti-
mately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn." Id. at 525.
99 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
100 Id. at 720.
101 Id. at 722.
102 Id. at 723.
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seizure, the procedures invoked were constitutionally deficient:
The warrants gave the broadest discretion to the executing officers; they
merely repeated the language of the statute and the complaints, speci-
fied no publications, and left to the individual judgment of each of the
many police officers involved the selection of such magazines as in his
view constituted "obscene . . . publications" . . . . [The officers] were
provided with no guide to the exercise of informed discretion, be-
cause there was no step in the procedure before seizure designed to
focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.
103
The Court distinguished Marcus from Kingsley in that the New York
procedure in Kingsley provided for the judge to view the allegedly ob-
scene material, 0 4 sanctions were imposed only as to specifically named
publications,'0 5 and there was a requirement that the decision on the
merits be made within two days of trial.10 6 The possible requirement
of a prior adversary hearing was discussed:
. . . Kingsley Books does not support the proposition that the State may
impose the extensive restraints imposed here on the distribution of these
publications prior to an adversary proceeding on the issue of obscenity,
irrespective of whether or not the material is legally obscene ...
[T]here is no doubt that an effective restraint-indeed the most effec-
tive restraint possible-was imposed prior to a hearing on the circula-
tion of the publications in this case, because all copies on which the
police could lay their hands were physically removed from the news-
stands and from the premises of the wholesale distributor. An op-
portunity comparable to that which the distributor in Kingsley Books
might have had to circulate the publication despite the interim restraint
and then raise the claim of nonobscenity by way of defense to a prosecu-
tion for doing so was never afforded these appellants because the copies
they possessed were taken away.' 0 7
The Court implied that a judicial determination prior to seizure is re-
quired in all instances; but with respect to mass seizures an adversary
rather than ex parte proceeding will be required.
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan'"8 involved no search and seizure;
rather, it was an action to determine the validity of the powers vested in
a commission created by the Rhode Island Legislature. 1 9 This agency
103 Id. at 732. See also Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968)
(film seizure).
104 367 U.S. at 735.
20 Id.
100 Id. at 737.
107 Id. at 735-36.
108 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
109 Id. at 60 n.1.
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was charged with educating the public regarding any material which
might tend to corrupt children and, where appropriate, to recommend
criminal prosecution. Appellants, several book and magazine dis-
tributors, brought an action in the Superior Court of Rhode Island urg-
ing that the enactment creating the Commission was violative of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
They therefore asked that the actions of the Commission be enjoined.
The prayer for injunctive relief was granted but the court refused to de-
clare the enactment unconstitutional. On appeal the state supreme
court agreed with the ruling on the constitutional issues but reversed the
injunctive relief."' The United States Supreme Court invoked jurisdic-
tion on the ground that "the state court judgment sought to be reviewed
upheld a state statute against the contention that, on its face and as ap-
plied, the statute violated the Federal Constitution.""' The Court
noted that the practice of the Commission was to notify the distributor
that certain books or magazines had been found to be objectionable for
children under 18 years of age and that listings of these titles were being
sent to local police agencies, which generally resulted in the removal of
these materials from circulation." 2 Appellants contended that the prac-
tices of the Commission "amount[ed] to a scheme of governmental
censorship devoid of the constitutionally required safeguards for state
regulation of obscenity.""' 3 The Court agreed, noting:
The Commission's practice . . . provides no safeguards whatever
against the suppression of nonobscene, and therefore constitutionally
protected, matter . . . [and thus constitutes] a system of prior ad-
ministrative restraints . ... Any system of prior restraints of ex-
pression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. . . . such a system [has been tolerated] only
where it operated under judicial superintendence and assured an al-
most immediate judicial determination of the validity of the restraint.
. . . There is no provision whatever for judicial superintendence before
notices issue or even for judicial review of the Commission's determina-
tions of objectionableness. The publisher or distributor is not even
entitled to notice and hearing before his publications are listed . . .
as objectionable."
4
110 Id. at 61.
111 Id. at 61 n.3, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1964).
112 372 U.S. at 61-64. During oral argument the State admitted that several
of the books included in the notifications were not within the Court's definition of
obscene.
"13 Id. at 64.
"14 Id. at 70-71 (citations and footnote omitted).
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It may be argued the practices under consideration were analogous
to a "mass seizure" in that the dissemination of all copies of the ma-
terial deemed to be questionable was effectively prevented. Although
the Court did not expressly so hold, it seems apparent that the distribu-
tor must be given an opportunity to be heard prior to listing the pub-
lications as objectionable. Further, it seems the "judicial superinten-
dence" of which the Court speaks must be in the nature of a judicial
proceeding. Whether the required proceeding need be ex parte or ad-
versary, or whether both might be required at different stages is unclear.
What may well be the landmark case concerning procedures for
the search and seizure of obscene materials is A Quantity of Copies of
Books v. Kansas (Quantity of Books).1 5 In Quantity of Books, a
Kansas statute"16 which authorized the seizure of allegedly obscene
publications and required their destruction after an adversary deter-
mination of obscenity, was challenged. In a verified information seek-
ing the issuance of a search warrant, fifty-nine book titles were identi-
fied and copies of seven books were filed with the document each of
which contained the same publishing caption. 117 The judge "conducted
a 45-minute ex parte inquiry during which he 'scrutinized' the seven
books"" 8 and determined them to be obscene. He also found "reason-
able grounds to believe that any paper-backed publication carrying the
[same publishing caption] would fall within the same [paper-backed]
category.""' 9 A warrant was issued for the seizure of all books identi-
fied by title in the information. Thirty-one titles, totalling 1,715
books, were seized. A hearing was held ten days later and the warrant
was sought to be quashed on the ground that there had been no ad-
versary hearing prior to seizure. The motion was denied and all copies
seized were ordered to be destroyed after a final hearing, conducted
approximately six weeks later. 20
The Court discussed Marcus and refused to distinguish it, stating:
It is our view that since the warrant here authorized the sheriff to
seize all copies of the specified titles, and since [the owner] was not
afforded a hearing on the question of the obscenity even of the seven
novels before the warrant issued, the procedure was likewise constitu-
tionally deficient.' 2 '
115 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
116 Id. at 207-08 n.1; KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-1102 et seq. (Supp. 1961).
17 378 U.S. at 208.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 208-09.
120 Id. at 209.
121 Id. at 210.
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Kingsley Books was distinguished because no injunctive measures were
imposed until after an adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity. 122
It was further stated:
A seizure of all copies of the named titles is indeed more repressive than
an injunction preventing further sale of the books. . . . We therefore
conclude that in not first affording [the owner] an adversary hearing,
the procedure leading to the seizure order was constitutionally defi-
cient.12
3
The fact that a full adversary hearing followed the seizure did not satisfy
the constitutional requirement, "[flor if seizure of books precedes an
adversary determination of their obscenity, there is danger of abridg-
ment of the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circula-
tion of nonobscene books.' '1
24
Justice Stewart noted 125 that the procedures employed would have
been valid, "at least with respect to the material which the judge 'scru-
tinized',"'126 if hard-core pornography were involved. Justice Harlan,
with whom Justice Clark joined, 127 dissented on the basis of his dissent
in Jacobellis v. Ohio.128  In that case he was of the opinion that the
state properly exercised its power in banning the questioned books:
[T]he states are constitutionally permitted greater latitude in determin-
ing what is bannable on the score of obscenity than is so with the Fed-
eral Government. . . . [the better approach lies] in permitting the
States wide, but not federally urestricted, scope in this field, while
holding the Federal Government with a tight rein .... 129
In Quantity of Books, Justices Harlan and Clark stated that the Kan-
sas statute dealt strictly with seizure and forfeiture, provided adequate
"notice", imposed no restraint upon unpublished material and was simi-
lar to the injunctive provisions of the civil statute in Kingsley. They
therefore felt that although the Kansas statute was part of one which
imposed criminal sanctions, it was limited to narrowly defined -areas
and required an expeditious determination of the issues. Further, they
said the statute was like a penal sanction, rather than a system of cen-
sorship in that the state was required to defend its action at a full hear-
122 Id.
123 Id. at 210-11.
124 Id. at 213.
125 Id. at 214 (concurring opinion).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 215 (Harlan & Clark, J.1., dissenting).
128 378 U.S. 184, 203 (1964).
129 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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big on the issue of obscenity.13 0  Justice Harlan also noted that, while
not required by statute, the judge conducted an ex parte hearing, the
officers had no discretion in executing the warrant, and in light of
Marcus there was every reason to believe the statute would be applied
in a fair manner to avoid undue delay.'
A careful analysis of Quantity of Books indicates that it stands for the
proposition that, at least in a situation involving a mass seizure where
there is a provision for the ultimate destruction of the material, a prior
judicial determination at an adversary hearing is required prior to seiz-
ure. Although the Court at one point discusses a hearing "before the
warrant issued'" 32 it later refers to "the procedure leading to the seiz-
ure order".'3 3 It would appear that the Court was more concerned with
the seizure aspect of the order and, arguably, a different conclusion might
result if the warrant only permitted a search.
The emphasis on "mass seizure" as distinguished from other seizures
was made by the Court two years later in Mishkin v. New York.'
3 4
Affirming a conviction under a state obscenity statute the Court
stated it would not consider appellant's claim that the materials intro-
duced into evidence were the fruits of an illegal search and seizure since
the record on appeal was incomplete.' 35 It is unclear whether the Court
in Mishkin was suggesting that only when a mass seizure occurs is there
potential violation of First Amendment guarantees, or whether it was
merely limiting its discussion to the fact situation presented. It should
be noted that the Court's continued reliance upon Quantity of Books and
Marcus is further recognition that a prior adversary hearing is at least
required in certain instances.
B. United States Courts of Appeals Decisions
With one seeming exception' 36 the United States Courts of Appeals
130 Id. at 223 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'31 Id. at 219-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 210.
'33 Id. at 211.
'34 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
'35 Id. at 503 n.1; N.Y. PEN. LAW ANN. § 1141 (McKinney 1954). Several con-
siderations were set forth which may give some insight as to the factors determinative
of a constitutionally valid search:
[Wlhile the search and seizure issue has a First Amendment aspect because of the
alleged massive quality of the seizures . . .[citing Quantity of Books and Marcus]
the record in this regard is inadequate. There is neither evidence nor findings
as to how many of the total available copies of the books in the various book-
stores were seized and it is impossible to determine whether the books seized in
the basement storeroom were on the threshold of dissemination. 383 U.S. at 513.
130 United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969).
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which have considered the question uniformly hold that an adversary
hearing is required prior to the issuance of a search warrant for the
seizure of allegedly obscene material. In Metzger v. Pearcy137 four
prints of a motion picture film were seized from different theaters
by police without a search warrant and contemporaneous arrests were
made. A federal district court138 enjoined the prosecuting officials
from further interference with the showing of the film and ordered
the return of all seized prints to the owner, with the provision that one
print be delivered upon request to the prosecuting attorney for use in
the preparation or trial of pending criminal cases.139  The court of
appeals, relying upon Marcus and Quantity of Books, stated:
[L]aw enforcement officers cannot seize allegedly obscene publica-
tions without a prior adversary proceeding on the issue of obscenity.
Such a seizure violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and is a prior restraint condemned by the Supreme
Court.'
40
The court noted that the aforementioned rules apply equally to mo-
tion pictures, citing several Supreme Court decisions so holding.1
4 1
Cambist Films, Inc. v. Duggan 42 also involved multiple seizures of a
film print without a search warrant. The court observed that a deter-
mination of obscenity was made by police officers without any judicial
review:
We cannot agree with the basic premise of the district court that police
officers may, after viewing a motion picture themselves, determine
whether it is obscene and, if they determine it to be obscene, proceed
to arrest the exhibitor and seize the film without a warrant. On the
contrary, it is now settled that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution require that there be an adversary judicial hearing
and determination of obscenity before a warrant may be issued to
search and seize alleged obscene materials [citing Marcus and Quantity
of Books].
143
137 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968).
138 The federal courts will generally accept jurisdiction of state obscenity procedures
upon application of the defendant. These actions are usually filed alleging infringe-
ment upon the civil rights of the defendant(s) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
139 393 F.2d at 204.
140 Id.
'4' Id. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Kingsley International Pic-
tures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952).
142 420 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1969).
143 Id. at 689. It is interesting to note that the court relied heavily upon Flack v.
Municipal Court, 66 Cal. 2d 981, 429 P.2d 192, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1967), wherein the
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In Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson144 a film was seized pursuant to a search
warrant supported by police affidavits. The magistrate had viewed the
film prior to issuance of the warrant. In affirming a district court in-
junction against further seizures, the court required the return of the
film. The court held the principles enunciated in Quantity of Books
applicable to films, and thereby established the requirement of a prior
adversary hearing, analogizing to proceedings involved in an applica-
tion for a preliminary injunction. 145  Tyrone refused to distinguish
Metzger although no search warrant had been obtained in that case, and
since the court there "focused on the lack of the [prior adversary] hear-
ing.1'41 Moreover, Tyrone like Metzger, required that "the theater
deliver to the Commonwealth's Attorney, upon request, a copy of the
movie for reasonable use in the preparation and trial of the charges now
pending in the state court.' 47
A situation virtually identical to Tyrone existed in Bethview Amuse-
ment Corp. v. Cahn,'48 and the court similarly held that the failure to
provide for an adversary hearing prior to seizure violated the First
Amendment. 40 The prosecution sought to distinguish Marcus and
Quantity of Books on the ground that a mass seizure of books is distin-
guishable from the seizure of a single print of motion picture film. 50
This contention was rejected by the court:
We are told that the Bethview Theater has 300 seats. Assuming half
of them to be occupied for four showings of a film each day for a
week, over 4,000 individuals would see the film. Preventing so large
a group in the community from access to a film is no different, in the light
of first amendment rights, from preventing a similarly large number of
books from being circulated.151
The court suggested that a print of the film could be obtained without
California Supreme Court held that, except where an emergency exists, obscene ma-
terial may not be seized without first obtaining a search warrant. Flack did not dis-
cuss the necessity of affording a prior adversary hearing. In fact, this decision had
been relied upon for the proposition that none is required. See Monica Theater v.
Muncipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1970); People v. de Renzy, 275
Cal. App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969).
144 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
145 410 F.2d at 641.
146 Id.
147 Id. At note 4 on page 641, the court expressly reserves opinion as to whether
the film would be admissible in evidence.
148 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969).
149 Id. at 411-12.
150 Id. at 412.
151 Id. There is a conflict between the New York state courts and the Second
Circuit. See People v. Steinberg, 60 Misc. 2d 1041, 304 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Cty Ct. 1969).
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the necessity of a seizure either by direction of the court or by means of
a subpoena duces tecum.152 In response to the prosecution's conten-
tion that unless a copy of the film were in the possession of the au-
thorities pending an adversary hearing the film might be taken from
the jurisdiction or edited to delete the offensive scenes, the court stated
"[i]f there is a real threat of such activity it can be controlled by an ex
parte restraining order."' 53
A different panel of judges in the same circuit reached an opposite
conclusion in United States v. Wild, 54 decided almost simultaneously
with Bethview.' 55 In Wild the defendants were convicted of conspiracy
to use the mails for soliciting the purchase of obscene color slides and
photographs. The slides and photographs, the subject of the prosecu-
tion, were seized incident to the defendant's arrest. No search war-
rants had been obtained although arrest warrants had been issued. The
court distinguished Marcus and Quantity of Books from Wild:
These cases are inapposite since they involved massive seizures of
books under state statutes which authorized warrants for the seizure
of obscene materials as a first step in civil proceedings seeking their de-
struction. The seizures in this case were of instrumentalities and evi-
dence of the crime for which appellants were indicted and lawfully ar-
rested. We do not believe Marcus and Quantity of Books can be read to
proscribe the application of the ordinary methods of initiating criminal
prosecution to obscenity cases.' 56
Defendants sought a rehearing in light of Bethview.117 It should be
152 416 F.2d at 412.
158 Id.
154 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969).
155 Bethview was argued on July 24, 1969, and decided on October 6, 1969. Wild
was argued on September 11, 1969, and decided on October 29, 1969.
156 422 F.2d at 38.
157 But the Court, in refusing to reverse its decision, distinguished the two cases:
First, the Bethview court did not have before it an appeal from a convic-
tion in which the seized film had been introduced into evidence; therefore, it did
not hold that such a conviction would have to be reversed. While the panel there
ordered the film returned, it did not say that the print could not be used by the
prosecution in a trial on the outstanding criminal charge. In fact, the court in
Bethview indicated precisely to the contrary ....
Second, the Bethview panel analogized "a single print of a motion picture film"
to seizure of "a large number of books" because in both instances, without any
prior adversary hearing, a large group in the community is denied access to ma-
terial that may be entitled to First Amendment protection. Thus, the Bethview
panel pointed out that a single motion picture print could be seen by over 4,000
people in one week. This is not true of other kinds of allegedly obscene ma-
terial, e.g., a single copy of a magazine or of an underground newspaper, or of a
single copy of a slide similar to those involved here. The Bethview panel did not
hold that it is improper, after a lawful arrest, to seize as evidence a few samples
of this kind of allegedly obscene material, each of which can, by its nature, be
seen by only a few people. Id. at 39 (petition for rehearing) (citations omitted).
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noted here that while Wild involved an appeal from a federal criminal
conviction, Metzger, Cambist, Tyrone, and Bethview involved federal
injunctive relief to stay state criminal proceedings.
The most recent, and in many respects the most incisive analysis by a
circuit court, is found in Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon.'58 In Dpmich the
defendants were charged with exhibiting motion picture films in viola-
tion of California obscenity statutes." 9 The court affirmed a district
court order directing the return of the seized films and enjoining fur-
ther seizures without a prior adversary hearing. 10  The court took this
opportunity to express its opinion as to the unique nature of the First
Amendment rights involved 16 and then ruled on the narrow issue of
"whether the rule of [Quantity of] Books should apply in the case of seiz-
ure of a single copy of film held for exhibition to theater patrons.' 62 Al-
though it was urged upon the Court that Quantity of Books was ap-
plicable only to mass seizures, the court rejected this argument:
Where First Amendment rights are exercised by distribution and sale
of materials, the proportions of the seizure may well bear on the ques-
tion whether it constituted restraint. Here, however, the rights are exer-
cised not by sale but by exhibition, and restraint clearly follows from
seizure of the materials to be exhibited or of the means of exhibition.
108
158 426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S.
Aug. 11, 1970).
150 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 311, 313 (West 1970).
100 426 F.2d at 646.
101 [T~he First Amendment poses problems respecting the seizure of allegedly
obscene materials not present in the seizure of other forms of contraband or evi-
dence of crime. Procedures "designed to focus searchingly on the question of
obscenity" must be provided to avoid suppression of constitutionally protected
publications or the interruption of their dissemination. Id. at 645 (citations
omitted).
102 Id.
103 Id. (footnote omitted). An equally cogent and well-reasoned dissent distinguishes
the cases relied upon by the majority:
The prosecution of cases involving obscenity is essentially a state problem.
State judges like federal judges are familiar with the provisions of the United
States Constitution and must enforce them where applicable.
[Metzger, Tyrone, and Bethview] have each condemned a seizure of a film
without a prior adversary hearing. But each of the cases have inconsistencies
which largely destroy the efficacy of the decisions.
(1) Each court directly or impliedly provided the exhibitor must furnish the
prosecutor with a copy of the film seized for the purpose of a prosecution, al-
though the original seizure was disapproved.
(2) No satisfactory answer is supplied to the proposition that the defendant
may stand on his Fifth Amendment right against incrimination and refuse to
deliver the film.
(3) Although the decisions purport to say that the seizure takes from the
public the right to view matters which may be within the protection of the First
Amendment, by the same token the subsequent delivery of the film for the purpose
of the prosecution will tie up the film and rob the public of its right to view
matters which may be within the protection of the First Amendment.
(4) Nor do the cases afford any protection against the mutilation or excision
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Thferentially the court seemed to express the view that selective seizure
of items from a mass of material for distribution or sale requires merely
an ex parte judicial determination. Extending this rationale, it may be
argued that where several prints of a film are possessed for purposes of
exhibition in a lesser number of locations the necessity for a prior ad-
versary determination of obscenity may be substantially less compelling.
The court distinguished between the procedure required prior to
search and that required prior to seizure:
So far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, probable cause can be
shown as it always has been shown-ex parte and, without recourse to
the film itself, by a showing of obscenity through use of affidavits, testi-
mony, or still photographs, such as was made here. All that Books re-
quires in deference to the First Amendment is that before seizure a
prior adversary hearing be afforded. Should the film exhibitors, on
hearing, choose not to produce the film to rebut the showing of probable
cause and should an order for seizure follow they would have waived
any right to complain that the magistrate had failed to consider the
film as a whole. Should the film exhibitors choose not to avail them-
selves of the opportunity afforded them for a hearing, they would effec-
tively have waived their First Amendment rights and execution of a
warrant for seizure forthwith would be entirely proper.
104
It seems permissible that, pursuant to a warrant issued after an ex parte
proceeding, a search may be conducted to discover whether specified
allegedly obscene material is present at a location. It seems equally
permissible, under the "plain view" doctrine, 165 that any material ob-
served will not be immune from seizure. While it is incumbent upon
the authorities to afford an adversary hearing prior to seizure, it is
reasonably inferable that this hearing may also encompass those ma-
terials observed during the permissible search. Also, any additional
of the film before it is tamed back to the possession of the prosecution. There is
a showing in the record [that one of the defendant's deleted] portions of the
film between the time it was seen by the officer and the time it was seized by the
same officer. An affidavit by the officer stated that [defendant] deleted the most
objectionable portions of the film.
Until the United States Supreme Court authoritatively decides the issue of
seizure and use of a film for the purpose of a criminal prosecution, I would follow
the California state decision. Id. at 646-47 (citations omitted), citing People v.
de Renzy, 275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969).
The decision which the dissent would follow, while noting the delicate nature of First
Amendment rights, held that "state law enforcement officers, acting under authority of
a search warrant, may seize at least one copy of [material] when necessary for use as
evidence in a later adversary proceeding." Id. at 386, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
164 426 F.2d at 646.
165 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968); People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1968).
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materials would be equally subject to the protective order suggested by
the court in Demich.166  Whether such "protective order" would afford
any more than illusory protection from alteration or destruction of the
materials observed incident to the permissible search, but not within the
scope of the warrant, is a problem which every magistrate must face
when issuing orders of this nature.
Without belaboring the point it will suffice to note that while a prior
adversary determination on the issue of obscenity may be required in
certain instances, it may not be constitutionally required under all cir-
cumstances. A further consideration of federal and state decisions will
serve to illustrate the divergence of opinion as to what procedures are
required in a given factual setting.
C. United States District Court Decisions
1. Materials Other Than Films
Discussion of federal district court cases, which have been called
upon to consider the necessity of a prior judicial determination of ob-
scenity before the seizure of material, will initially focus upon cases in-
volving the mass seizures of books, magazines and materials other than
films.
In United States v. Brown,'6 7 following an ex parte proceeding, a
warrant was issued ordering the seizure of sixteen cartons of allegedly
obscene books. The Commissioner neither viewed any of the ma-
terials, though the contents of three cartons had been inspected by an
FBI agent, 168 nor was there any prior determination of obscenity.
Agents proceeded to seize 419 cartons of materials, subsequent to which
the defendant was charged with transporting sixteen cartons of obscene
material in interstate commerce.'" 9 Defendant sought the suppression
and return of the materials pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 170 The government urged that the seizure was valid as in-
cident to a lawful search warrant and, in the alternative, it was incident
to a lawful arrest and therefore valid. The court met the contention
that the seizure could be justified as incident to a lawful arrest:
This result cannot be avoided by the rubric of a search incident to a
lawful arrest. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has apparently determined
166 426 F.2d at 646.
167 274 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
168 Id. at 562.
169 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465 (1964), cited in 274 F. Supp. at 561-62.
170 FED. R. Clm. P. 41(e).
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that borderline speech must be protected by the application of relatively
elaborate procedures prior to suppression via seizure. Such procedures
are impossible to follow in a seizure incident to arrest. As the Supreme
Court of California recently noted "within the precinct of the First
Amendment, only the requirement that a search warrant be obtained
prior to any search or seizure assures a free society that the sensitive de-
termination of obscenity will be made judicially and not ad hoc by police
officers in the field."'171
The court also stated:
Although the Supreme Court has not set down the precise constitu-
tional standards for a conventional search and seizure of obscene ma-
terials in a criminal case, it has had occasion to express its view on such
searches and seizures in the context of three civil forfeiture cases.
[citing Quantity of Books, Marcus and Kingsley] . . . . A search
and seizure for the purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal ob-
scenity prosecution imparts at least the same potential restraint on the
dissemination of material protected by the First Amendment as one
made solely for the purpose of commencing forfeiture proceedings.
The common thread running through recent Supreme Court decisions
on the seizure of allegedly obscene matter is that because the line be-
tween protected and unprotected speech is so difficult to draw, dis-
semination of a particular work should be completely undisturbed, at
least until an independent determination of obscenity is made by a ju-
dicial officer. Complete restraint on any work must await a final ju-
dicial determination of obscenity.
172
It was emphasized that publications must be guaranteed unobstructed
circulation prior to a determination of obscenity and that the procedures
followed in Kingsley "approach the minimum safeguards allowable un-
der the federal constitution.""'  The evidence seized in Brown was
suppressed since a mass seizure had taken place, none of the materials
had been examined by the commissioner ordering the seizure, the de-
fendant was not given an opportunity to be heard prior to seizure, no
publications were listed by name, and 403 cartons of materials were
taken in addition to those listed in the warrant.
174
Although apparently neither party raised the issue, the court took the
opportunity to discuss modem United States Customs practices, where
customs officials may hold and inspect allegedly obscene imports to de-
171 274 F. Supp. at 565, citing Flack v. Municipal Court, 66 Cal. 2d 981, 429 P.2d
192, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1967).
172 274 F. Supp. at 563 (citations omitted).
173 Id. at 564.
174 Id. at 565.
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termine whether forfeiture proceedings shall ensue, 175 as an example of
a permissible non-judicial restraint. These statutes are not subject to
constitutional infirmity if procedures are established which set up nar-
row guidelines for the expeditious determination of the issue of ob-
scenity.17 6 With respect to books and magazines, the court notes that
these, like all imports, are subject to inspection; however, it qualifies
what may be done thereafter, stating:
Once this period of detention for general customs purposes has ceased,
however, it would seem that under Kingsley, Marcus and A Quantity
of Copies of Books, the customs officials should be required to turn
over the publications to the claimant, subject to later injunctive pro-
ceedings, rather than holding onto them, as they do now, until after a
judicial determination on the question of obscenity.177
The court concluded that the customs cases are distinguishable since
statute and practice in that area have created rigid procedural safe-
guards and the rapid judicial determination of obscenity. 178
It is arguable that Brown has been superceded, at least as to seizures
which are incident to a lawful arrest, by Wild, 79 which held such seizures
to be permissible. However, Wild can be distinguished since it involved
an appeal from a conviction rather than a motion to suppress as in
Brown. Moreover, only a few slides were seized in Wild compared
with 419 cartons of material in Brown.
In Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich °80 multiple defendants' 8'
were arrested and their publications were seized without a warrant.
There was an adverse determination of the constitutional issues in the
state court8 2 and they subsequently took the case to the federal district
court. In each instance officers had previously purchased materials
similar to those seized. The seizures were comparatively "selective",
and though substantial, were not of the "mass" dimensions in the sense
175 Id. See Tarrif Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 688, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1964).
176 274 F. Supp. at 565.
177 Id. at 566.
178 Id. at 565-66.
179 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969). Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969) seems
controlling in that Circuit as to the necessity for an adversary proceeding prior to seizure
at least with respect to films and large quantities of material.
180 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969) (3 judge court).
181 Individual plaintiffs on removal were commercial distributors in two Louisiana
parishes, while the corporate plaintiff was a New York based supplier. The actions
were joined for decision by the federal court.
182 304 F. Supp. at 664. Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1343, 2201, 2281 (1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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used previously.18 3 Relying in part upon Books, Metzger, and Brown,
the court discussed a broad spectrum of requirements concerning cases
involving First Amendment rights:
Since prior restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights
can be exerted through seizure (with or without a warrant) of the al-
legedly offensive materials, arrest (with or without a warrant) of the
alleged offender or through the threat of either or both seizure and ar-
rest, the conclusion is irresistible in logic and in law that none of these
may be constitutionally undertaken prior to an adversary judicial deter-
mination of obscenity.
We are mindful of the fact that even attempts to regulate obscenity
incorporating procedures for affording the required adversary hearing
would themselves constitute prior restraints. . . . Nonetheless, it is ap-
parent that there must be some permissible prior restraint, be it how-
ever subtle, if obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment and
State attempts to regulate it are to be enforceable. . . . [Such proce-
dures] may have to incorporate provisions immunizing alleged violators
from criminal liability for any activities occurring prior to an adversary
judicial determination of the fact of obscenity. 84
The court found that the procedures utilized in the Delta Book seizures,
even with respect to the items purchased, were constitutionally imper-
missible since no prior adversary determination was made 85 and all
materials were ordered suppressed and returned.' 0 In extending the
requirement of a prior adversary hearing further than the previously dis-
cussed cases, Delta Books seems to torture the concept of prior restraint.
The very fact that prosecutions result from enforcement of obscenity
laws creates a "chilling effect'" on the dissemination of marginal ma-
terial; but if there is to be any enforcement of these laws a practical
procedure must be devised which intrudes only to the slightest degree
on the rights of the alleged offender while permitting the state to imple-
ment the mandate of the legislature and the courts.
A detailed presentation of the facts in two recent cases is set forth
below to illustrate the potential abuse in permitting law enforcement
officials to operate "within their sound discretion."
In Miske v. Spicola, e8  law enforcement officers180 purchased two
183 One seizure involved virtually the entire stock of the material during a two
month period, and this may, in effect, qualify as a "mass seizure".
184 304 F. Supp. at 667 (footnotes omitted).
185 id.
186 Id. at 670.
187 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
188 314 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
189 City of Tampa, Florida.
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publications from a store and after an ex parte proceeding in which
these items were the only "evidence", obtained a search warrant. The
warrant was served that day and approximately 1,059 publications and
158 films were seized.19 One month later the store owner was charged
in a criminal information with selling obscene magazines. Another
information filed the same day charged the owner with possession for
sale of "certain allegedly obscene publications". 19' Five months later
two additional magazines were purchased at the same location by offi-
cers. Subsequently another search warrant was obtained, also after
an ex parte hearing, and a seizure pursuant to this warrant resulted in
the confiscation of "magazines, films, checks, business records and other
materials listed in a 17 page inventory.' 92  Three months later a
third warrant was issued, again after an ex parte proceeding, based upon
the two magazines purchased during the previous visit. Among the
items seized were "magazines, paperback books, phonograph records
[numbering 1,111] a cash register tape, an electric and a water bill, a
metal box with $10.00 therein, a money bag, and money from the cash
register in the total amount of $98.12.' ' 9 3  The allegation was also
made that approximately 12,000 copies of material were seized, with-
out a warrant and without any prior judicial proceeding, from a truck
driver who arrived at the location during the seizure.' 94 Additional
criminal charges were brought following the seizure.
In City News Center, Inc. v. Carson,95 decided three months later, 96
police officers entered a store and purchased two cellophane-wrapped
publications, removed the wrappers and inspected the contents. The
manager of the location was then advised that the officers intended to
arrest the clerk who had sold them the items. A signal was given by
one of the officers and nine additional officers entered the store and
commenced removing magazines from the shelves. Pursuant to their
"sound discretion", 103 titles representing some 900 volumes of ma-
terial were seized in addition to twelve coin-operated arcade machines
containing films. Four prisoners from the -local jail accompanied the
officers as well as two trucks which were utilized to transport the items
190 314 F. Supp. at 963.
191 Id. The criminal charge included items obtained in the seizure.
192 Id.
'93 Id. at 964.
'94 Id.
195 310 F. Supp. 1018 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
196 The instant seizure occurred April 10, 1969, while the second Miske seizure
occurred April 11, 1969.
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seized. The police had invited several newspaper reporters and televi-
sion cameramen to witness the seizure, and they were permitted to enter
the location. There was neither a warrant for the seizure nor a prior
judicial determination of obscenity.'97 It was further noted that the of-
ficer who made the initial purchase had no prior training in the area
of obscenity and his sole test as to what was obscene was subjective,
encompassing only "whether private organs were exposed in a 'sugges-
tive' or 'lewd and lascivious manner'."'
198
In both instances the courts unhesitatingly found the procedures
utilized to be violative of constitutional guarantees, in that there had
been no prior adversary hearing, and each ordered the return of the
materials. The Miske court, after declaring a prior adversary hearing
to be a constitutional guarantee, 199 suggested a possible approach to
this requirement indicating that it need not be a "fully matured action"
and "such a matter could be determined on an application for a pre-
liminary injunction in an appropriate State court, after notice to the ad-
verse party and an opportunity for him to be heard."200 The court fur-
ther suggested that a "civil action for declaratory relief' with eventual
destruction of the materials, analogous to a civil forfeiture proceeding,
might suffice.210 The City News court in a strongly worded opinion
stated "a prior evidentiary hearing" must be held "in all cases involving
seizures, whether of films or books",20 2 then proceeded to discuss the
contention of respondent police officers that the seizures were valid as in-
cidental to an arrest:
In making such an arrest, the officer necessarily was placed in the posi-
tion of having to determine probable cause that the materials being
sold were in fact obscene before the arrest could be made. An ad hoc
determination of obscenity by a single officer [inexperienced and un-
familiar with] constitutional principles is grossly insufficient to protect
against unwarranted infringement of freedom of expression.
Even with the benefit of experience and briefing on the law, such a
procedure would be inadequate because probable cause as to whether
obscenity exists has come to be recognized as a matter of constitu-
tional judgment, unique in the law because of the fragile nature of the
right protected, and incapable of determination by a policeman, grand
jury, or judge acting ex parte, without a prior finding of probable
'97 310 F. Supp. 1021 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
198 Id. at 1020.
199 314 F. Supp. at 964.
200 Id.
201 Id. (citations omitted).
202 310 F. Supp. at 1021.
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cause in a judicially-supervised adversary hearing....
Not only would it be constitutionally impossible for a policeman to
decide, under the conditions of this seizure, that probable cause existed
to justify arrest, the courts themselves have had great difficulty in de-
ciding what is obscene, even after an adversary'hearing ...
Consequently ...a prior adversary hearing is necessary before an
arrest can be made, even where the sale of allegedly illegal materials
takes place in the presence of the arresting officer.
20 3
Gable v. Jenkins, 20 4 one of the most recent occasions upon which a
court has been asked to consider the necessity for prior judicial de-
termination of the issue of obscenity, involved the arrest of an individual
and the seizure of several books incident to the arrest.20 5 The court
initially disposed of the contention that the Georgia statute206 was
"vague and facially overbroad",20t and then discussed whether the stat-
ute was unconstitutional because it failed to "provide for a prior ju-
dicial determination [of obscenity] with an adversary proceeding before
arrest.'208  Although the issue is framed as one relating to "arrests"
the court goes on to discuss "seizures". The court does not distinguish'
between seizures incident to an arrest and those which are pursuant to a
search warrant; in fact, the only mention of utilizing a search warrant
is a comment in a footnote to the opinion.2 0 9  The court accepted as a
matter of law that a prior adversary proceeding is constitutionally
necessary before the seizure of obscene material 210 and stated:
There is proper procedure existing in the Georgia law that can achieve
constitutional standards, i.e., a prior adversary judicial proceeding be-
fore the seizure of the allegedly obscene items. Accordingly, [the
statute] is not unconstitutional in that it does not establish a prior ju-
dicial hearing within itself.
211
The court then undertakes to set forth procedures which might be fol-
lowed by the State in order to satisfy the constitutional requirements:
As examples, the following are presented: When a search warrant
203 Id. at 1021-22 (citations omitted).
204 309 P. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (3 judge court), aff'd, 397 U.S. 592 (1970).
205 309 F. Supp. at 999.
206 Id. at n.1 (quoting Georgia statute).
207 Id. at 1000-01.
208 Id. at 1001.
209 Id. at n.3.
210 Id. at 1001. The court noted that this was particularly true with respect to the
seizure of motion picture film. See also Leslie Tobin Imports, Inc. v. Rizzo, 305 F.
Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (seizure of allegedly obscene political slogan buttons pur-
suant to warrant issued without a prior judicial determination of obscenity).
211 309 F. Supp. at 1001 (footnote omitted).
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is applied for to seize the alleged obscene materials, the person possess-
ing the same could be given notice of the intent to apply for the search
warrant, and be given an opportunity to be present at such time, and
present evidence in opposition to the issuance of the search warrant.
Or an order to show cause why the alleged obscene film is not obscene
could be served on the possessor, or a petition to have the film de-
clared contraband, and subject to destruction could be served on the
possessor.
212
In what may superficially appear a somewhat solicitous attempt to jus-
tify its holding and mollify law enforcement officials the court adopts
the Carter v. Gautier21s rationale for the requirement of an adversary ju-
dicial determination of obscenity prior to seizure, not as an adverse re-
flection upon law enforcement officials, but on the assumption that a
judicial officer is "better equipped than they to pass upon the important
and sometimes difficult question of obscenity." There is no dis-
tinction drawn, as in Demich, between the procedures prior to search
and those prior to seizure. A strict interpretation of these constitutional
guarantees would seem to support the Gable approach. If the two-
step Demich procedure is utilized,214 undoubtedly some degree of prior
restraint would be imposed since it would be necessary to protect the
material to be seized from alteration or destruction. The inherent de-
lay involved could prevent the material from being disseminated with-
out a valid court order.
However, situations exist where the Gable approach, if strictly ad-
hered to, would unduly hamper the prosecution and perhaps make its
task impossible. For example, if an investigation has led officers to
facts which establish probable cause to believe that a particular business
is engaged in the preparation of obscene material and a warrant is de-
sired to search the premises for such material, it may be impossible to
have an adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity at that time since
there is no specific material available to be brought before the court.
Also, if the information is obtained through a reliable informant who
describes the material as photographs of persons engaged in acts of in-
tercourse and oral copulation with no accompanying text, this may be
212 Id. at n.3.
213 305 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (M.D. Ga. 1969) (3 judge court) (seizure of one print
of motion picture film). See also 309 F. Supp. at 1001. The "solicitous" use of this
language should be noted. The following language appeared after the quoted language
in the decision relied upon, -but was deleted in the instant opinion. This is so because
"The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools
.... " Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
214 426 F.2d at 646.
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sufficient to establish probable cause to enter the premises and search
pursuant to a warrant; however, such information may not be sufficient
for a determination of obscenity that would satisfy the mandates of the
First Amendment. The Demich approach, therefore, seems to be the
most reasonable and practical.
Two district court decisions have refused to interpret the requirement
of a prior adversary hearing as broadly as the foregoing cases. In
Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary215 state statutes216 were upheld since an
adversary hearing prior to arrest or seizure was not prohibited and
the statute could be constitutionally applied.217 The court interpreted
the rule in Quantity of Books to be limited to the "seizure of sub-
stantial quantities of books or other matter" '218 and upheld a seizure
incident to arrest:
No decision has thus far prohibited the normal police function of effect-
ing an arrest and the seizure of sample evidence of a suspected crime
being committed. Such an arrest and a limited supporting seizure are
not tantamount to a prior restraint since the jeopardy faced is essentially
the restraint of obscenity law itself in respect of the remainder of the
wares on the shelves and self-censorship in respect thereof at the option
of the merchant.
219
The court went on to conclude:
It seems ludicrous to suggest that apprehension of suspected criminals
and their unsavory wares requires adversary court proceedings to stamp
the contents as probably obscene and to obtain authorization for an ar-
rest and a seizure of the evidence supporting the arrest.
220
The Rage court concluded that while a court is determining the ques-
tion of obscenity the "peddlers and purveyors of smut" 221 could con-
tinue to sell their materials, perhaps to a greater extent due to the pub-
licity generated by the proceeding, and the danger would exist that the
material would become unavailable for the prosecution. The court
held that "a seizure limited to specimens of the allegedly obscene ma-
terials to substantiate an arrest by the evidence thereof is a reasonable
and not unconstitutional exercise of the police power and function. 22
215 301 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
216 N.Y. PEN. LA w § 235.10(1) (McKinney 1967); N.Y. CODE CIM. PRoc. § 791
et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
217 301 F. Supp. at 548.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 549.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 551. In ruling upon the reasonableness of the search and seizure, the
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In ABC Books, Inc. v. Benson223 plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment that certain state statutes224 were unconstitutional, and injunc-
tive relief to prohibit their future enforcement.220 The statutes pro-
vided two types of injunctive relief available to the prosecution.220
Plaintiffs contended in part that the statutes were prima facie uncon-
stitutional in not providing for a prior adversary hearing; 227 however,
the court held that since such a hearing was not prohibited the statute
could be constitutionally applied.228  It was also urged that the statutes
were impermissible prior restraints in that there was no provision for no-
tice or a speedy judicial determination of obscenity prior to the ex parte
issuance of the temporary injunction.
229
Appellants argued that two recent Supreme Court cases controlled,
but the court distinguished their factual settings. Carroll v. President
and Commissioners of Princess Anne 230 involved the exercise of First
Amendment rights in the realm of political expression, and the ABC
court, citing Quantity of Books, noted that the issue of "timeliness" may
be critical in allowing unhindered dissemination of ideas:
court stated:
Possession of six specimens of a book or magazine has been made, by statute,
presumptively a holding intended for commercial promotion. . . . Thus, seizure
of six specimens of each title or issue alleged to be obscene and present at any one
time in plaintiff's store is a reasonable and proper seizure, reasonably needed for
evidentiary purposes. Id. at 551 (citation omitted).
223 315 F. Supp. 695 (M.D. Tenn. 1970) (3 judge court).
224 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3003, 39-3004, 39-3005, 39-3007 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1970).
225 315 F. Supp. at 697.
226 The first was a criminal provision which permitted the issuance of a tem-
porary injunction enjoining an individual from removing allegedly obscene material
from the jurisdiction pending an adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity when it
is believed that he has violated the provision and which requires the hearing to be
"within two (2) days after joinder of issues" and following the issuance of the injunc-
tion. If an indictment issues, the material must be delivered to the court or prosecu-
tion for use as evidence. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3003 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1970); 315
F. Supp. at 697-98 n.1. The statute further stated: "This [statute] shall not be construed
to permit the seizure or suppression of any material, obscene or otherwise, such seizure
or suppression to be lawful only as expressly provided by law." TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-3003 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1970). The second statute was strictly a civil injunctive
provision which created an action to enjoin the display or dissemination of obscene
material, with the defendant entitled to a court trial within two days after issuance of
the temporary injunction and joinder of issues, further providing that the court must
render its decision within two days after the trial. In the event of a permanent injunc-
tion, the defendant was required to surrender all material for destruction. Id. § 39-3005;
315 F. Supp. at 698-99 n.3.
227 315 F. Supp. at 698-9.
228 Id. at 699.
229 Id. at 698-99.
230 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (attempted enjoinment of future white supremacy rally).
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It is vital to the operation of democratic government that the
citizens have facts and ideas on important issues before them. A delay
of even a day or two may be of crucial importance in some instances.
On the other hand, the subject of sex is of constant but rarely particu-
larly topical interest.
231
Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack,232 which involved state film censorship
provisions imposing an unconscionable delay prior to judicial scrutiny,
was distinguished on its facts.
2 33
The ABC court found the time limit within which to initiate post-in-
junctive proceedings to be an adequate constitutional safeguard even
though the temporary injunctions issued without notice to the parties234
and constituted a limited prior restraint.136  This was justified in light
of Freedman v. Maryland236 which involved a statute requiring the sub.-
mission of films to a censorship board prior to exhibition and was devoid
of the safeguards of judicial superintendence. After a discussion of the
required minimal standards to avoid impermissible prior restraint,
237
it was held:
Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the
merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for
the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution ...
to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous de-
nial of a license..2
38
The ABC court held that the Tennessee provisions:
[S]ufficiently limit the preservation of the status quo prior to an ad-
versary hearing and final determination of the question of obscenity,
as required by Freedman. . . . since it is constitutionally permissible
for the Tennessee statutes to authorize such a limited temporary in-
junction, there is no necessity for a provision for notice in the statutes.
239
In distinguishing Carroll the court emphasized the critical nature of
timeliness in safeguarding the democratic process, as opposed to the
comparatively less "topical" nature of free expression in the area of ob-
scenity. The court should have more closely considered the broader
231 315 F. Supp. at 700, citing A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S.
205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
232 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (Fifty to fifty-seven day administrative delay before
initiation of judicial proceeding).
233 315 F. Supp. at 701.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 700.
236 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
237 Id. at 58.
238 Id. at 59.
239 315 F. Supp. at 701.
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ramifications of the language therein. In light of the following they
might have arrived at a conclusion contrary to that reached:
There is a place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without no-
tice, of temporary restraining orders of short duration; but there is no
place within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment for such orders where no showing is made that it is impossible to
serve or to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity
to participate.
240
2. Films
The federal district courts which have been called upon to consider
the question of the seizure of motion picture films, without a prior
judicial determination on the issue of obscenity, have generally agreed
with the circuit courts that such a procedure is constitutionally in-
valid.
241
The characteristics peculiar to this mode of expression are such that,
to date, the two cases which have discussed the seizure of a single print
of motion picture film have held that such a seizure is indistinguishable
from the "mass seizure" technique employed in the realm of publica-
tions.
2 4 2
The approach taken by the federal district court in Carroll v. City of
Orlando143 is representative of the decisions of the federal district courts.
Police officers seeking a search warrant for the seizure of a motion
picture film presented affidavits to a municipal court judge who exe-
cuted the warrant solely on the basis of these affidavits. There was no
prior adversary determination on the issue of obscenity. Pursuant to
the warrant a single copy of the film was seized and the exhibitor was
arrested. Defendant's motion to suppress the film as evidence and to
compel its return was denied. 44  Defendant-exhibitor sought relief in
the federal court, which agreed to consider the matter.2 4r After ac-
cepting "the general proposition that a prior adversary judicial determi-
240 393 U.S. at 180.
241 See Newman v. Conover, 313 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Carroll v. City
of Orlando, 311 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (3 judge court); Carter v. Gautier,
305 F. Supp. 1098 (M.D. Ga. 1969) (3 judge court); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Tribell, 293
F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Ky. 1968); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D.
Ill. 1968).
242 Carroll v. City of Orlando, 311 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (3 judge court);
Cambist Films, Inc. v. Tribell, 293 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Ky. 1968).
243 311 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (3 judge court) and cases cited therein.
244 Id. at 971-72 (App.).
245 Id. at 967 n.2.
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nation must be made before obscene material may be seized",246
the court stated the principal issue was "whether law enforcement offi-
cers may for the purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal
prosecution seize a single print of film . ..without having an adver-
sary judicial hearing prior to the seizure."24 7 Recognizing a conflict of
authority248 the court adopted the reasoning in Bethview Amusement
Corp. v. Cahn2 49 which held that, although a single item of material
had been seized, the practical effect of the seizure was to deny a sub-
stantial segment of the public access to material presumptively protected
by the First Amendment until proven to the contrary. The film was
ordered suppressed as evidence and returned to the exhibitor, thereby
effectively terminating the prosecution.
Two federal district courts have unqualifiedly refused, in film cases,
to require a prior adversary determination of obscenity as a prerequisite
to seizure. In Bazzell v. Gibbens25' owners and operators of a theater
were arrested for exhibiting a film and one print was seized pursuant to
a search warrant which had been issued after an ex parte proceeding to
determine probable cause. 2 2  The only issue presented to the court was
"whether or not the Constitution of the United States compels, in all
cases, an adversary hearing on the question of obscenity prior to seizure
of the thing alleged by the state to be obscene. '2 53  The court noted
that circuit court decisions have relied upon Quantity of Books as
authority for requiring adversary proceeding prior to the seizure of a
motion picture film; however, the court refused to extend the rule in
Quantity of Books beyond the facts of that case.264 Quantity of Books
240 Id. at 968.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969).
250 311 F. Supp. at 969.
251 306 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. La. 1969). This cause was brought in federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), 1343(4) (1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
262 306 F. Supp. at 1058-59.
253 Id. at 1059.
264 The Bazzell court stated:
[N]othing in the case law to indicate that in every case where a seizure of alleged
obscene material is to be made, a pre-seizure adversary hearing is constitutionally
required. Whether or not such a hearing is required must depend upon the na-
ture and purpose of the seizure. If the seizure is made for the purpose of destroying
the thing seized and for the purpose of preventing the dissemination of the material
involved, then [Quantity of Books] teaches that an adversary hearing prior to the
seizure and/or destruction of the material is required in order not to run afoul of
the First Amendment guarantee to the right of freedom of expression. But where,
as here, a single copy of a film is seized for the sole purpose of preserving it as
evidence to be used in a criminal action to be brought pursuant to a state statute
already held, in all respects pertinent hereto, to be constitutional on its face, such a
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and Delta Books were considered distinguishable in that both involved
seizures of materials in excess of that which could conceivably be re-
quired for evidentiary purposes, raising a strong inference that the seiz-
ures were to prevent dissemination. 55 In Bazzell the court noted:
It is true that the seizure of the film here would prevent that particular
film from being shown by the plaintiffs. . . for as long as it remained in
the custody of the State officials, but that is merely a collateral effect of
the seizure necessary to the criminal prosecution to follow. 25 6
The court's distinction seems at best illusory in considering permissible
the seizure of a single print of film for evidentiary purposes. There is
an absolute disregard for the ultimate effect of the seizure. For what
more effective contravention of public access can there be than to pre-
clude the exhibitor from utilizing the print? This seems particularly
true in light of Bethview 5 7 The Bazzell court also notes that two circuit
court decisions where films have been returned for lack of a prior ad-
versary hearing have required the exhibitor to make a copy of the film
print available to the prosecution for use in preparation for trial and at
the trial itself, and concludes that there is no distinction between the
prosecution obtaining the film by a court order or by seizure.2 18 Again
the court seems to disregard the "chilling effect" created by a seizure as
opposed to allowing the film to remain in the possession of the distribu-
tor with the understanding that it will be made available to the prose.
cution for a limited purpose.
In Hosey v. City of Jackson25 9 police officers visited a theater, viewed
a motion picture in its entirety, then seized the film without a warrant
and without a judicial determination of any kind.260  Apparently the
seizure cannot be said to be violative of the First Amendment's guarantees albeit a
side effect of such a seizure coincidentally prevents that one particular copy of the
film from being further disseminated pending the outcome of the criminal proceed-
ings. Unlike the situation in [Quantity of Books), the seizure made here was
not made for the purpose of preventing the dissemination of the information con-
tained in the film.. . . On the contrary, it was made in order to preserve the film
and to use it in proceedings to decide whether or not its dissemination by these
plaintiffs, or by anyone else, does in fact violate the Louisiana obscenity statute.
Id. at 1059-60 (citations omitted).
255 Id. at 1060.
256 Id.
257 The Bethview decision was rendered October 6, 1969 by the Second Circuit,
while Bazzell was rendered December 9, 1969 by a district court in the Fifth Circuit and
the Bazzell court may have been unaware of Bethview. Although one circuit is not
bound by another, incisive logic should not be susceptible to the impediment of arbitrary
geographic boundaries nor the vagaries of temporal coincidence.
258 306 F. Supp. at 1061.
259 309 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (3 judge court).
260 Id. at 529.
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officers' sole guideline was their subjective opinion that it constituted ob-
scenity, the dissemination of which was proscribed by statute. The
exhibitors were arrested and subsequently convicted. State appellate
proceedings were stayed pending a determination of constitutional is-
sues by the district court.2" 1 In discussing whether a prior judicial de-
termination was required the court held that "the seizure of an allegedly
obscene film as incident to lawful arrests for a crime committed in the
presence of arresting officers . . . does not exceed constitutional bounds
in the absence of a prior judicial hearing on the question of its obscen-
ity."'262 This reasoning is clearly contrary to every decision in the federal
courts. In no prior cases were police officers permitted to effect such an
arrest and seizure to absolutely bar further dissemination. The court
justified this extraordinary decision on the grounds that to require a
judge to attend a showing in a theater would be untenable and to re-
quire officers to obtain a judicial determination prior to seizure or order
the film brought into court could result in disposal or alteration of the
film. 203
Assuming arguendo that a judicial hearing prior to seizure may occa-
sionally frustrate statutory provisions concerning dissemination of ob-
scene matter, it must be borne in mind that permeating all such provi-
sions are the guarantees of the First Amendment, whose delicate na-
ture have traditionally been considered transcendent to the vagaries of
convenience. Though delicate in nature, these rights weigh heavily on
the scales of justice and must be given priority over the possibility that
an individual prosecution might be avoided.
It seems no less untenable to myopically presume that the sole means
of judicial scrutiny prior to seizure is the somewhat ludicrous scenario
2 1 Id. at n.2. Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3),
1343(4), 2281, 2284 (1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
262 309 F. Supp. at 533.
203 The court stated:
[Any judicial hearing prior to the seizure of an allegedly obscene film at the
time of exhibition would completely frustrate the purpose and operation of
[the statutory provision] prohibiting the exhibition of obscene movies. Certainly,
if a prior judicial hearing were required, it would be necessary for the hearing
judge to view the film as exhibited on the occasion giving rise to the prosecution.
To require a judge to proceed from one theater to another or attend numerous
showings of a film at a particular theater with the mere possibility of viewing an
obscene version is untenable. Furthermore, to require that the film be brought
into Court or that arrangements be made for a private showing of the film in a
particular theater provides no guarantees against the cutting or alteration of the
film prior thereto. Finally, if police officers, after viewing an obscene film, were
required to leave the theater in order to obtain a judicial determination on the ques-
tion of obscenity by merely reporting the contents to the proper judicial officer, a
judicial determination under such conditions would not only be extremely difficult
and subject to error, but by the time a seizure could be made, the film might be
altered or even shipped to another theater or location. Id. at 535.
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of conveying a member of the bench hither and thither in pursuit of an
allegedly obscene exhibition. An ex parte proceeding may be con-
ducted upon the strength of verified affidavits. Should an adversary pro-
ceeding be required, this might also be satisfied through the filing of veri-
fied affidavits of all parties setting forth their contentions concerning the
matter. This would be minimal satisfaction of such a requirement.
In meeting the contention that no guarantee exists to preclude the
possibility of alteration or destruction of potentially damning segments
of the film it is certainly within the court's authority to issue a protec-
tive order restraining such alteration or destruction. Though it is argu-
able that such an order might well constitute an idle gesture, such in-
firmity might readily be remedied through the testimony of competent
witnesses.
The court's final contention clearly illustrates the policy underlying
the necessity for a prior adversary judicial determination before the
seizure of a motion picture film. It is the fact that an ex parte de-
termination would be "subject to error" which compels both sides to
litigate the issue of probable cause before seizure. Moreover, it is more
probable there will be error when an officer is allowed to render a con-
stitutional judgment on the question of obscenity in the field. If there
is a real and apparent danger of the film being removed while a court
order is being obtained then the print could undoubtedly be seized un-
der an emergency exception.2 64 Any such seizure would have to be de-
fended at a subsequent motion to suppress the evidence.
D. California Decisions
The California position concerning the minimal requirements to jus-
tify search and seizure of allegedly obscene matter requires a narrowly
drawn search warrant, supported by affidavit issued after an ex parte
judicial proceeding. 25 A post-seizure adversary determination of ob-
scenity is available before trial, as is appellate review of such determina-
tion.260 While California has ruled upon the distinction between mass
and single copy seizures of publications, it has not considered the
analogy of a single print film seizure to the mass seizure of publications.
California apparently does not permit indiscriminate mass seizure of
264 See, e.g., Flack v. Municipal Court, 66 Cal. 2d 981, 991 n.10, 429 P.2d 192,
198 n.10, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878 n.10 (1967).
265 Id. at 990-91, 429 P.2d at 198, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
266 CAL. P.N. CODE ANN. §§ 1538.5, 1539 (West 1970); Monica Theater v.
Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1970); Childress v. Municipal
Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 611, 87 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1970).
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any material.2 7
The foremost case delineating the procedural elements which must
be satisfied prior to the seizure of allegedly obscene matter is Flack v.
Municipal Court,268 where petitioners sought a writ of mandate to
compel the return of a motion picture film seized by police officers inci-
dent to an arrest. 26 9 There was neither an arrest nor search warrant.
The court held, under procedures available at the time, that a writ of man-
date would lie to compel the relief sought,270 and then proceeded to dis-
cuss the requisite specificity and judicial superintendence necessary to
the issuance of a search warrant for the seizure of material falling within
the ambit of the First Amendment. The court noted that in this area
civil and criminal procedures do not differ since "purported obscenity
maintains, until such time as it is judicially determined to be unprotected
speech, the same 'preferred position' as does free speech generally
and the ordinary rules of search and seizure are inapplicable to it."
2s7 1
The court in adopting the reasoning of Aday v. Municipal Court=
7 2
stated:
While it is settled that in the ordinary case a search incident to an
arrest is not "unreasonable" if the arrest itself is lawful, the First Amend-
ment compels more restrictive rules in cases in which the arrest and
search relate to alleged obscenity. The lesson . . . is that since consti-
tutionally protected speech is involved, "Determination by police officers
of the status of suspected books, papers, etc.-whether to be classified
as obscene or not obscene-is not enough protection to the owner to
constitute due process."
Thus, with the exception of a situation involving a legitimate emer-
gency [defined by Aday as arrest situations involving a high probability
that evidence may be lost, destroyed, or spirited away, and may un-
der appropriate circumstances justify seizure without a warrant] even
if the search is contemporaneous with an arrest, a search warrant must
be secured prior to any search for or seizure of material alleged to be
obscene.
2 73
207 People v. de Renzy, 275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969).
208 66 Cal. 2d 981, 429 P.2d 192, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1967).
269 Id. at 983, 429 P.2d at 193, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 873. Relief in the form of al-
ternative writ is no longer available to the defendant in a misdemeanor prosecution in
California. CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1538.5(j) (West 1970).
270 66 Cal. 2d at 985, 429 P.2d at 194, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
271 Id. at 989, 429 P.2d 197, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (citation omitted).
272 210 Cal. App. 2d 229, 26 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1962).
273 66 Cal. 2d at 990-92, 429 P.2d at 198-200, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 878-80 (cititations and
footnote omitted). The court also notes the incongruity which would arise should
"unfettered discretion in seizures" incident to an arrest without warrant be permitted,
yet condemned if pursuant to an overly broad warrant.
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The court, cognizant of the potential burden placed upon law enforce-
ment agencies in their task of interdicting the corrosive influence ob-
scenity exerts upon the fabric of modem society, issued the following ad-
monition:
[C]ourts are often presented with procedurally bad cases and, in deal-
ing with them, appear to be acquiescing in the dissemination of ob-
scenity. But if cases were well prepared and were conducted with the
appropriate concern for constitutional safeguards, courts would not
hesitate to enforce the laws against obscenity. Thus, enforcement agen-
cies must realize that there is no royal road to enforcement; hard and
conscientious work is required. 274
The California Supreme Court has not been called upon to rule
whether an adversary determination of the issue of obscenity might be
necessary before seizure. However, in two recent decisions, 275 the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal has ruled upon the safeguards provided by
California compared with those of the weight of authority in the federal
courts, holding the state provisions adequate. In People v. de Renzy
2 70
police officers seized two reels of allegedly obscene motion picture film
pursuant to a search warrant. There had been no prior adversary deter-
mination of obscenity277 and it may be assumed that the warrant issued
upon the strength of police affidavits at an ex parte judicial proceeding.
The exhibitor sought and was denied suppression of the prints and their
return pursuant to the California Penal Code.17 8 On appeal the superior
court affirmed but, upon motion of the exhibitor, certified a transfer to
the court of appeal to determine the force and effect of Metzger v.
Pearcy279 on California law. The court agreed to hear the matter stat-
ing the sole issue as "whether, even under an otherwise valid search
warrant, such matter may be seized without a prior determination of
obscenity at an adversary judicial proceeding. '28  The exhibitor con-
tended "as an absolute rule that there may be no seizure of matter,
although established by oath or affirmation to the satisfaction of a mag-
istrate as probably obscene, without a prior adversary judicial proceed-
ing. The court noted that, while lower federal court decisions were
274 Id. at 993, 429 P.2d at 200, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 880, quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964) (Warren, CJ., dissenting).
275 Monica Theater v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71
(1970); People v. de Renzy, 275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969).
276 275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1969).
277 Id. at 383, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
278 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 1538.5 (West 1970).
279 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968).
280 275 Cal. App. 2d at 383, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
281 Id.
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entitled to great respect, they were not binding authority on the states,
even on constitutional matters. 28 2 It was of the opinion that while cau-
tion was necessary in the preservation of the integrity of constitutional
guarantees
[w]e must nevertheless not interpret [First and Fourth Amendments] in
such a manner as to deny to California the power to enforce its obscenity
laws. Any construction of a constitutionally granted right which pre-
vents the enforcement of a constitutionally enacted criminal statute is
itself a constitutional impairment.
283
In declining to follow what may be considered the federal approach, the
court set forth the following reasons:
If the rule argued for by [the exhibitor] be the law, then California's
law enforcement authorities, . . . are faced with a curious dilemma.
They are permitted by the state and federal Constitutions, and directed
by statute, to enforce the state's obscenity laws. On the other hand they
may not seize alleged obscene materials, even under a search warrant,
without a prior adversary proceeding. Any court process designed to
compel production of the questioned material would obviously impinge
upon the possessor's Fifth Amendment rights. Thus, although seizure of
obscene material is conditioned upon a prior adversary hearing, the state
would be without power to produce the evidence essential to that hear-
ing. This result is unreasonable and should be avoided. We recognize
that there may be circumstances where, by fortuity, obscene matter may
be produced by the state without need of search or seizure or court
process, e.g., books offered for public sale. In such cases any seizure
without prior adversary proceedings obviously would be constitutionally
impermissible. But we do not believe that enforcement of a vital state
criminal statute must necessarily rest upon some chance windfall of
evidence.
28- 4
Distinguishing Metzger the court discussed the fact that reliance in
that decision was placed upon Quantity of Books and Marcus, each of
which involved mass seizures of all copies of particular publications.
The court stated:
Nothing is found in Metzger, Books or Marcus that condemns a nar-
row, discriminating seizure, under a search warrant issued upon a rea-
sonable finding of probable cause therefor by a magistrate, of so much
obscene material as is reasonably necessary for a later adversary pro-
ceeding.
285
282 Id., citing People v. Willard, 238 Cal. App. 2d 292, 305, 47 Cal. Rptr. 734,
742-43 (1965); see Stock v. Plunkett, 181 Cal. 193, 194-95, 183 P. 657 (1919).
283 275 Cal. App. 2d at 384, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
284 Id. at 384, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (citation omitted).
285 Id. at 386, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
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It is suggested that the Metzger court recognized the necessity for the
prosecution to obtain copies of the material under consideration in that
a print of the film was ordered to be given to the prosecutor for use in
the pending trial. The court then stated:
[L]aw enforcement officers, acting under authority of a search war-
rant, may seize at least one copy of an alleged obscene . . . material
when necessary for use as evidence in a later adversary proceeding,
without doing violence to the First or Fourth Amendment. 280
The de Renzy court based its decision upon the distinction between
mass seizures of publications as opposed to a single print of film, as well
as the potential denial of essential evidence to the prosecution, the in-
adequacy of state procedural safeguards and Fifth Amendment con-
siderations concerning compulsory production of evidence. As pre-
viously noted the seizure of a single print of film may be virtually
indistinguishable, in its ultimate effect, from a mass seizure of other ma-
terial in that both situations involve substantial curtailment of public
access.
Monica Theater v. Municipal Court,28 7 the most recent California de-
cision to consider a prior adversary determination of obscenity, pre-
sents a more detailed analysis of the statutory provisions and their ra-
tionale. In Monica a search warrant was prepared for the seizure of a
single print of commercially exhibited motion picture film. The war-
rant was subsequently signed and issued by a judge of the Municipal
Court relying solely upon the affidavit which accompanied the warrant.
Criminal proceedings were instituted against the exhibitor who promptly
moved to quash the search warrant and obtain the suppression and re-
turn of the film seized.288 A hearing was held in the municipal court
thirteen days after seizure at which time the supporting affidavit and
declarations of the defendant and his attorney were received in evidence.
The affiant and the district attorney who assisted in preparing the war-
rant were cross-examined, the film seized was viewed and admitted in
evidence, and comparable material offered by the defendant was
viewed.28 9  It was the contention of the defendant that the procedure
prior to issuance of the warrant was deficient since there had been no
286 Id. at 386, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
287 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1970).
288 Id. at 4-5, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73. The warrant was issued on November 22,
1967.
289 Id. at 6, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74. The defense submitted films of a comparable
nature which had previously been found not to be obscene, as well as one which had
not been adjudicated which the defense urged was obscene. While the court viewed
these, none were introduced into evidence.
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prior adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity, the magistrate had not
viewed the film, the description of the film in the affidavit was inade-
quate, the officer did not evaluate the film applying contemporary com-
munity standards and customary limits of candor, and the hearing es-
tablished the officer had incorrectly described the film. Probable cause,
the defendant argued, was not established for its seizure. The court re-
jected each contention of the defendant and found the seizure to be
valid.29
One month later the defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandate
in the superior court raising the same points urged at the previous hear-
ing and further alleging that the procedures followed constituted a prior
restraint, a denial of due process, and a constitutionally impermissible
seizure. The superior court issued an alternative writ and 75 days
later, upon hearing, ruled in favor of the prosecution and found that
the procedure followed was sufficient to establish probable cause. On
appeal, defendant contended: 29'
1. The issuance of the warrant for and the seizure of the motion pic-
ture film and the photographs without a prewarrant adversary pro-
ceeding or ex parte view of the material violated the free speech, due
process, and seizure provisions of the Constitutions of the United
States and California.
2. The issuance of the warrant and the seizure of the film and photo-
graphs, solely in reliance upon the affidavit of [the officer], which was
allegedly conclusional and formulated under unconstitutional standards,
was violative of all of said constitutional provisions.
3. The failure of the People, at the probable cause hearing before the
magistrate, to adduce any evidence that the film goes beyond customary
limits of candor in the description of sex matters, appeals to the prurient
interests of the average person, and is utterly without redeeming social
importance, renders the continued holding of the film violative of said
constitutional provisions.
5. The warrant, seizure, hearing and review procedures pursued in the
instant case did not provide a speedy determination of the question of
whether the film and photographs were protected by or excepted from
free speech provisions of the Constitution.
The court concluded, in an opinion delivered 944 days after the initial
seizure2 92 that:
290 Id. at 6, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
291 Id. at 7-8, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75 (footnote omitted).
292 Certified and filed for publication on June 23, 1970, by the Second Appellate
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In California, by means of a section 1538.5 motion, a very prompt ad-
versary judicial proceeding can be secured .... Conceivably the review
of the initial nonadversary judicial evaluation or a de novo consider-
ation can be under way within 24 hours, or less, of the seizure. The
section does not specify a time within which the magistrate must rule,
but he will be aware of the prior restraint doctrine particularly appli-
cable to films currently being shown and of the need to rule promptly in
order to be in harmony therewith and not to jeopardize his ruling.
(emphasis added)
293
The court was of the opinion that the only issue before it was the
question of probable cause and not the procedures for conducting a pre-
trial on-the-merits determination of obscenity, although it concluded
the latter was available to a defendant.294 The court noted where there
is a challenge based upon lack of probable cause for issuance of a war-
rant or a blatant violation of federal or state constitutional standards, a
motion under section 1538.5 is the exclusive remedy for the return or
suppression of property.295
The Monica court expressed the view that no United States Supreme
Court decision had squarely dealt with the issue of pre-warrant adversary
hearings or an ex parte viewing of the film by the issuing magistrate. In-
stead it turned to Flack and de Renzy, distinguishing the former
and relying upon the conclusion in the latter that "an adversary pro-
ceeding and view of the film are promptly and readily obtainable after
the issuance of a warrant through the medium of a section 1538.5 mo-
tion.'' 296 The court discussed the California procedures in light of
District, Division Five, of the Court of Appeal (2d Civ. No. 33606). Id. at 1, 88 Cal.
Rptr. at 71. It should be noted that the film was not released during this period.
293 9 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (footnote omitted). The court does
note that the defendant pursued appellate review in an improper manner. This may
have contributed to the 75 day delay before resolution of the matter in the Superior
Court. The court is silent, however, as to the ensuing 814 day time lapse at the ap-
pellate level. Also, the court was quite explicit in expressing that it dealt with a mis-
demeanor concerning a film.
294 Id. at 8-9, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76. See also Id. at 9 n.7, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 76 n.7.
295 Id. at 10-11, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 77, citing Childress v. Municipal Court, 8 Cal. App.
3d 611, 87 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1970). CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1538.5(a)(2) & (m)
(West 1970). Parenthetically, the court discusses the avenues of review available
from an adverse ruling on a 1538.5 motion, concluding that in a misdemeanor prosecu-
tion both the People and the defense have the right to an appeal, whereas, in
a felony prosecution, a writ of mandate or prohibition lies, directed to the Court
of Appeal. 9 Cal. App. 3d at 11-12, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 78. There may be a quali-
fication to the foregoing where an alternative writ may lie for the defense upon
a showing of undue hardship imposed due to the unavailability of a duplicate print
of film. Id. at 12, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
296 9 Cal. App. 3d at 13, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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Freedman v. Maryland 97 and concluded that its provisions were not
contrary to the spirit of this decision,2 98 in that initial consideration was
by a judge knowledgeable in the law and sensitive to the protection of
constitutional guarantees. Special considerations were noted. In the
event the exhibitor possessed only one copy of the film, release could
not be effected until expiration of the time for the prosecution's appeal
(ten days) from an adverse ruling on a section 1538.5 motion. In
such instances, the exhibitor may be entitled to an alternative writ or
preference on appeal.2 99 This would not seem to lessen the "chilling
effect" of the proceeding in that the exhibitor might still be subject to
further arrests and seizures for future showings of the same film.
The court refused to follow the line of federal authority in that "[tihese
noncontrolling decisions are not sufficiently persuasive to require a rul-
ing that the present California system . . . is unconstitutional."300  In
particular, the court distinguished Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon0 1 noting that
the court of appeals did not consider the adequacy of the California
statutory provisions, and adopted the reasoning of the dissenting opin-
ion. Not only did the court feel that the potential prior restraint was
brief, it found the California pre-warrant procedure adequate:
[O]ne or more affidavits submitted to the magistrate in support of a
request for a seizure warrant can be composed in a manner to focus
searchingly on the question of obscenity. Detailed pictorial word de-
scriptions of the continuity of the film plus the opinions of experts, whose
qualifications are adequately given, can serve this purpose initially. 0
2
While the foregoing may be true, the court itself indicated that the affi-
davit upon which the warrant was based was "not exactly overpowering,
particularly with respect to the officer's expertise and knowledge of con-
temporary standards and limits of candor. '30 3  It must be noted the
court found language in the affidavit "which would support an in-
ference by the magistrate" that the affiant was sufficiently qualified to
render an opinion as to the obscene nature of the matter.30 4 The lan-
207 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
298 It was noted that in one Maryland case "the initial determination took four
months and the final vindication on appellate review after six months." 9 Cal. App. 3d
at 14, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80. Contrast this with the length of time required for
final determination in Monica.
2909 Id. at 15 n.18, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.18.
300 Id. at 16, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
301 426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970).
302 9 Cal. App. 3d at 16, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
303 Id. at 16-17 n.19, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 82 n.19.
304 Id.
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guage upon which the court relied was the officer's description of the
film as "candid" and his allusion to "the meaning of the. . . opinions
of the United States Supreme Court,"30' 5 buttressed by the magis-
trate's personal familiarity with the officer. Extending this logic, it
seems some degree of familiarity with the affiant combined with con-
clusory allegations capable of supporting an inference of expertise could
be sufficient to establish the probable cause necessary to justify a seiz-
ure. Such a holding seems clearly unsupportable in light of Marcus v.
Search Warrants of Property."' The Monica court then proceeded to
excuse the necessity of providing guidelines for the issuing magistrate
by which he may judge the probable obscene nature of the questioned
matter:
[W]e feel that at the probable cause level a magistrate, certainly one
serving in an area as exposed to the broad scope of the entertainment
media as West Hollywood, would know by what standards the law re-
quires allegedly obscene material to be gauged, would have some know-
ledge about contemporary standards and customary limits of candor,
and would apply such knowledge when evaluating fact recitals in an affi-
davit.3 07
This statement, though seemingly contrary to the Giannini require-
ment of expert testimony308 was distinguished in that Giannini involved
an actual trial and not merely the issue of probable cause.3 0 9 However,
in Giannini it seems the California Supreme Court was establishing a
broader principle when it stated:
• ..the determination of obscenity is for juror or judge not on the basis
of his personal upbringing or restricted reflection or particular experience
of life, but on the basis of "contemporary community standards."
Moreover, since we designate the State of California as the relevant
"community" . . . we cannot realistically expect the trier of fact to un-
derstand intuitively how the community as a whole would react to al-
legedly obscene material.310
305 Id.
306 367 U.S. 717 (1961). Putting to one side the fact that no opportunity was
afforded the appellants to elicit and contest the reasons for the officer's belief, or
otherwise to argue against the propriety of the seizure to the issuing judge, still the
warrants issued on the strength of the conclusory assertions of a single police officer,
without any scrutiny by the judge of any materials considered by the complainant to
be obscene. Id. at 731-32.
307 9 Cal. App. 3d at 17, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (footnote omitted).
308 69 Cal. 2d 563, 574, 446 P.2d 535, 543, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 663 (1968).
309 9 Cal. App. 3d at 17 n.20, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 82 n.20.
310 69 Cal. 2d at 575-76, 446 P.2d at 544, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 664 (footnote omitted),
quoting in part Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Accord, 9 Cal. App. 3d
1, 21, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71, 85 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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If a statewide standard is to be applied, then the magistrate in West Holly-
wood would be no more qualified than the magistrate in Weed since nei-
ther would reach a determination based upon anything but the standards
and limits of candor in his particular community. Although the West
Hollywood area may be somewhat more urbane and sophisticated than
others, and perhaps certain magistrates may be subjected to a higher
degree of exposure to such material, with the advent of the statewide
community this type of determination is no longer permissible. The
court declined to discuss whether and to what extent evidence may be
offered, at a probable cause hearing after seizure, to the issues of con-
temporary standards and limits of candor. If the court is implying that
a determination of obscenity is not forthcoming at this hearing then the
speedy remedies available under the California statutes are illusory at
best. As to the requisite burden on the issue of probable cause, the
Monica court stated:
[T]he question would be whether a person of ordinary intelligence and
receptivity would conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion that the
material had any of the listed characteristics.
8 1'
It should be noted that, although it is highly probable the court intended
no such result, a literal application of this language would endanger a
substantial element of constitutionally protected expression. For if all
that is requisite to create probable cause sufficient for seizure is the
conscientious entertainment of a strong suspicion that any of the char-
acteristics are present in the mind of a person of ordinary intelligence
and receptivity, many motion picture, radio, and television broadcasts,
as well as many political publications and newspapers, could be subject
to seizure.
Exception must be taken with the holding in Monica and particularly
with the court's reasoning. In setting forth the relevant provisions of
section 1538.5, the court deleted certain language which is important to
a full understanding of the statute. The statutory language of subsec-
tion (a) follows, with omission by the court italicized:
A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evi-
dence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or
seizure on either of the following grounds:
(1) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable;
(2) The search or seizure with a warrant was unreasonable because
(i) the warrant is insufficient on its face; (ii) the property or evidence
obtained is not that described in the warrant; (iii) there was not
311 9 Cal. App. 3d at 20, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
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probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; (iv) the method of exe-
cution of the warrant violated federal or state constitutional standards;
or (v) there was any other violation of federal or state constitutional
standards.
8 12
Initially it may be noted that the statute seems to distinguish between a
search and a seizure. That such a distinction exists was alluded to by
the court in Demich,1 3 which stated that while probable cause may be
shown ex parte by means of affidavits, a prior adversary hearing is re-
quired before seizure.314 Since the usual film seizure is pursuant to a
warrant the omission of subsection (1) will not be discussed. There is
always the possibility that the warrant will be insufficient on its face in
that the film described may not contain any pornographic matter, in
which case it would be protected as a matter of law. Further, if the de-
scription in the affidavit is at variance with the film seized, a challenge
may be successful on the basis of subsection (ii). Most important, the
deletion of subsection (iv) begs the very question before the court, i.e.
whether the execution of the warrant without a prior adversary judicial
determination of obscenity is constitutionally impermissible. By inclu-
sion of this section the Legislature recognized the constitutional consid-
erations inherent in determining the validity of a particular search.
The Monica court stated that a review of an ex parte determination
of obscenity "can be underway within 24 hours, or less, of the seizure"; 31
however, this seems highly improbable within the framework of section
1538.5. Although there is provision, in a felony proceeding, for a hear-
ing on the motion "prior to trial and at least 10 days after notice to the
people unless the people are willing to waive a portion of this time,"810 no
such provision is included for misdemeanor prosecutions. While the
Monica court indicates, "[the magistrate] will be aware of the prior re-
straint doctrine particularly applicable to films currently being shown and
of the need to rule promptly in order to be in harmony therewith and not
to jeopardize his ruling, 317 this does not necessarily follow. Although
the court is of the opinion that the "open-ended" nature of the 1538.5
procedure is not violative of the precepts of Freedman v. Maryland,318
312 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1538.5(a) (West 1970).
313 426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970).
314 Id. at 646.
315 9 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (footnote omitted).
316 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1538.5(i) (West 1970). It should be noted that there
is no limit on the time which may elapse, this apparently being within the sole discre-
tion of the court.
317 9 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
318 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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it seems that the California provisions are patently offensive both to the
spirit and the letter of the law as enunciated by the United States Su-
preme Court. To vest in an inferior court virtually absolute discretion
in determining the calendar date for a 1538.5 motion seems as uncon-
scionable as it is untenable. Freedman stated unequivocally that
"'[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression bears . . . a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity.' . . . '[U]nder the Four-
teenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it
pleases for dealing with obscenity.' "319 Further, discussing a Maryland
procedure, the Court stated:
[Tihe exhibitor must be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial
construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either
issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film. Any restraint
imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must
similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest
fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution. (emphasis
added)3
20
The Monica court distinguished between a hearing pursuant to section
1538.5(a) and proceedings brought under 1538.5(n) 321 noting that
the former is a probable cause hearing while the latter may be a pre-
trial on-the-merits determination of obscenity. If this in fact is the case,
then the "judicial determination on the merits" compelled by Freedman
may not be held until after the people have exhausted their appellate
remedies from a granting of defendant's motion under section 1538.5(a).
It seems inconceivable that this would preserve the status quo for the
shortest fixed period of time.
The California provision has the effect of placing the burden upon the
exhibitor, at every stage of the proceeding, of removing the stigma of
prior restraint. At no time are the people called upon to defend their
action except upon motion of the defense.3 2' Not only must the de-
fense move for suppression and return of the evidence (a hearing to
follow at an uncertain date) but, should the motion .be successful, the
defense must endure an additional delay of ten days pending the people's
319 Id. at 57 (citations omitted).
320 Id. at 58-59.
321 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1538.5(n) (West 1970) states: "Nothing contained in
this section shall prohibit a person from making a motion, otherwise permitted by law,
to return property, brought on the ground that the property obtained is protected by
the free speech and press provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions . .. ."
322 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1538.5(a) (West 1970). Cf. Blount v. Rizzi, 39
U.S.L.W. 4120 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1971).
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decision whether to bring an appeal.3 2 The effect of this further re-
straint is minimal in comparison to the potential for further sequestra-
tion of the material. Should the people pursue their appeal rights the
film is retained pending the outcome. Although Monica indicated the
defense may pursue a writ of mandate in circumstances of undue hard-
ship, this right may be illusory due to its discretionary nature. Further,
the consequent monetary and temporal burden imposed upon the de-
fense is inconsistent with the fundamental abhorrence of prior restraint
upon free expression. The Monica court apparently perceived no in-
equity in permitting the fortuitous coalescence of conclusory allegations
and personal acquaintance to raise a mere inference to the level of prob-
able cause, thereby thrusting the exhibitor into a maelstrom of litigation
and effectively barring public access to material as yet not deemed un-
worthy of constitutional protection on the basis of a proceeding devoid of
constitutional safeguards.
In the rather unique circumstance where the exhibitor has been de-
prived of the material through seizure and criminal proceedings have not
been initiated, if he desires its return no relief is available under 1538.5
since this section is restricted to "defendants". Rather, he must under-
take an action in the superior court pursuant to other statutory provi-
sions3 24 which lack procedures for expeditious determination. Al-
though such matters as this usually receive some degree of priority there
is no explicit statutory compulsion, and the matter is therefore left to the
discretion of the court. Should the exhibitor be unsuccessful in his mo-
tion for the return of his property, his only remedy would be that of an
extraordinary writ to the court of appeal. Throughout this period the
exhibitor is denied the benefit of use of the material. This denial of
public access is an effective form of censorship. This would also seem to
create an impermissible prior restraint, since, at the time the exhibitor
brings his action, the state has not chosen the course of action it intends
to pursue. Should the exhibitor subsequently become a criminal de-
fendant he may be in the unenviable position of pursuing two actions-
the extraordinary writ and a motion pursuant to 1538.5. It would seem
the latter motion would be made for both suppression and return.
Though the prosecution might oppose this additional attempt for return,
claiming the exhibitor has had his day in court and the matter is in the
appellate process, this would be rather effectively rebutted by the in-
terim change in posture from petitioner to "defendant". Further,
323 Id. § 1538.5(e).
324 Id. §§ 1539-40.
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should the ruling on the 1538.5 motion conflict with the writ, the former
would seem to control (subject to appeal rights of the adversely af-
fected party) due to the change in circumstance. That a procedure
exists which may subject an individual to such extraordinary incon-
venience and expense, merely upon the strength of an affidavit suppor-
tive of an inference that probable cause exists, seems contrary to the
principle of fundamental fairness upon which our system of jurispru-
dence is said to have its foundation.
It is submitted that the California procedures do not afford adequate
safeguards for an expeditious determination of obscenity without a con-
comitant impermissible prior restraint. So long as criminal sanctions
are to be imposed, the bifurcated procedure which permits an ex parte
judicial determination prior to the issuance of a search warrant fol-
lowed by an adversary hearing prior to seizure seems to satisfy best the
requirements of the Federal and State Constitutions. In those cases
where commercially disseminated material is the subject of the action
there may be no "search" stage to the proceeding since generally the ma-
terial will have been previously viewed by the affiant and only the seizure
remains. At this juncture notice must be afforded the parties and an ad-
versary proceeding must ensue. Nothing less than this will avoid an im-
permissible prior restraint. On the other hand, where the subject of the
action has not been disseminated and a search is necessary to ascertain
the exact nature of the material, the bifurcated approach must be util-
ized.
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT CONsIDERATIoNs
Permeating virtually every procedure suggested by courts which have
attempted to satisfy the demands of the First and Fourth Amendments
has been an awareness of possible infringement upon the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Various aspects of this prob-
lem, in the context of compulsory production of allegedly obscene ma-
terial at an adversary proceeding, will be noted.
That the Fifth Amendment, granting one the privilege to decline
to testify in a criminal proceeding, is applicable to the states was
settled by Malloy v. Hogan in 1964.325 The limits of this privilege
have been delineated in Schmerber v. California,326 where a blood
325 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In Malloy, the Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of
a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence. id. at 8.
326 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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sample was taken from a drunk driving suspect in spite of his protest
and admitted into evidence at a subsequent trial. The Court held:
[T]he privilege [against self-incrimination] protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature ...
But the terms as we use them do not apply to evidence of acts noncom-
municative in nature as to the person asserting the privilege, even though
' * * such acts are compelled to obtain the testimony of others.
8 27
A further clarification of "testimonial" and "non-testimonial" evidence
was made by the Court:
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's
communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of
responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with
a subpoena to produce one's papers. On the other hand, both federal
and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against
compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measure-
ments, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand,
to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The dis-
tinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that
the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testi-
mony", but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source
of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it.828
The crux of the problem is whether compulsory production of al-
legedly obscene material is merely the source of "real or physical" evi-
dence, or is material of a "testimonial or communicative" nature. The
answer depends upon the factual setting in which the question is pre-
sented. A review of the "real or physical" examples presented in Schmer-
ber reveals that these are facts of an independent physical nature which
are not themselves the subject of the action. In the area of obscenity the
material itself is the subject of the judicial proceeding and has the attri-
butes of contraband the moment it is alleged to fall within the purview
of the proscriptive provision.
A determination of the characteristics of the material involved and
their evidentiary impact is necessary. Schmerber holds that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees the accused the right not to testify against
himself "or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial
or communicative nature"32 9 while excluding certain "non-communi-
327 Id. at 761 & n.5.
328 Id. at 763-64 (citation and footnote omitted); see also Holt v. United States, 218
U.S. 245 (1910).
329 384 U.S. at 761 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 4
SELECTED PROBLEMS IN OBSCENITY
cative acts". 330  In compelling the production of suspect material at
any adversary proceeding to determine the issue of obscenity, it is
clear that the State contemplates further action and that this ma-
terial will provide a "link in the chain" of evidence (as in the case of
the extraction and analysis of blood) necessary for imposition of sanc-
tions. The Schmerber plurality indulges in a remarkable exercise in
semantic gymnastics seemingly in an attempt to reason back from a
conclusion based upon public policy38' in which they justify a defend-
ant's compulsory production of the most damning piece of evidence
available on the ground that:
Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced com-
munication by the accused was involved. . . [h]is participation, except
as donor, was irrelevant to the results . . . which depend on [expert]
analysis and on that alone. Since the . . . evidence, although an in-
criminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony
nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the peti-
tioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.
332
It seems inconceivable that the Court could conclude that such an intru-
sion by the state could be considered anything but compulsory produc-
tion of evidence of a communicative nature. The dissent states a more
tenable position in noting that:
The sole purpose of this project . . . was to obtain "testimony" from
some person to [establish guilt] . . . the purpose of the project was cer-
tainly "communicative" in that the analysis . . . was to supply informa-
tion to enable a witness to communicate to the court and jury [guilt]. 333
The foregoing is no less applicable to films and publications. The
compulsory production of the material for judicial scrutiny, and expert
analysis, gives it a testimonial and communicative capacity. As pre-
viously mentioned, the moment it is alleged that the material is ob-
scene, it assumes the nature of contraband and is itself on "trial". As
elementary as it may seem, just as the defendant in Schmerber was on
trial so was his blood. The composition of the blood at the time of the
alleged transgression, not at the moment of trial, was at issue. The only
individual who had the ability to disclose this information was the de-
fendant. He was compelled to produce this information for analysis and
consideration by a third party. The analogous situation exists in the
case of obscene films or publications where the only individual possessing
330 Id. at n.5.
331 Id. at 761-62.
332 Id. at 765 (footnote omitted).
333 Id. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting).
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the information is required to produce the primary source of his potential
guilt. The only distinction is one of form. While the former repre-
sents compelled production of material for chemical analysis, the result
of which would represent the ultimate question bearing upon guilt, the
latter would require production of the means by which a sociological-
psychological analysis would be undertaken, the result of which would
represent the ultimate question determinative of prosecution. The ar-
gument invariably to be raised concerning a film or publication al-
ready in existence is that it represents an independent physical entity
much akin to a fingerprint, photograph or handwriting. However, it
must be remembered that such "non-testimonial" items are generally
already in the possession of the prosecution, the additional sample being
required merely for comparison. Should production of the material be
compelled, the disseminator would be forced to produce the primary
evidence of his potential guilt.
Some may argue a distinction between films and publications which
have been commercially exhibited or disseminated and those awaiting
distribution. By making such materials readily accessible to the public
and law enforcement agencies, it may be argued, he indicates that the
distribution has been undertaken only after balancing the potential risk
involved. Therefore, he may be said to have waived his Fifth Amend-
ment right. On the other hand it might be argued that the individual
who merely warehouses or otherwise collects the material for ultimate
distribution has not so waived this privilege since he may still exercise
his judgment against dissemination. A compulsory production of such
material would be analogous to the compulsory production of private
books and papers. 334 However there is no constitutional significance
to this distinction. That extrajudicial conduct in the exercise of busi-
ness judgment on the part of the distributor may be taken as an irrevoca-
ble waiver of a constitutional right seems untenable. Were this to be
accepted it would be equally permissible for the State to compel the re-
iteration of a speech already given in public over the express invocation
of the Fifth Amendment privilege on the ground that the content of
such speech was the ultimate question presented for determination in a
criminal proceeding.
It is therefore submitted that any compulsion exerted upon an in-
dividual to supply material, the analysis of which is determinative of the
criminal proceeding, is a compulsion to produce "evidence of a testi-
monial or communicative nature" in violation of Fifth Amendment
334 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
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guarantees.
In the context of an adversary hearing prior to seizure, in which
production of the material is not compelled by court order, the exhibitor-
distributor may be left no practical alternative but to produce the ques-
tioned material to rebut its depiction as obscene. Such rebuttal might
also require presentation of testimonial evidence on behalf of the ma-
terial. The question then becomes whether such an offering is ad-
missible against the exhibitor-distributor in a subsequent criminal pro-
ceeding. In light of Simmons v. United States 35 it appears the answer
is in the negative. In holding that an individual's exercise of privileges
available through the Fourth Amendment could not be considered a
waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court stated "we find it
intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in
order to assert another".,36  The Court's rationale may also be extended
to First Amendment rights. In discussing the prior practice of con-
sidering as admissible "voluntary" and uncompelled testimony, the Court
states:
A defendant is "compelled" to testify in support of a motion to suppress
only in the sense that if he refrains from testifying he will have to forego
a benefit, and testimony is not always involuntary as a matter of law
simply because it is given to obtain a benefit. However, the assumption
which underlies this reasoning is that the defendant has a choice: he
may refuse to testify and give up the benefit. When this assumption is
applied to a situation in which the "benefit" to be gained is that afforded
by another provision of the Bill of Rights, an undeniable tension is
created.33
7
In the framework of an adversary hearing to justify exercise of First
Amendment privileges, a surrender of Fifth Amendment privileges might
otherwise be required, thereby creating a classic example of the "damned
if you do damned if you don't" dilemma.
The principles which underlie the Simmons rationale are no less
compelling in the California 1538.5 procedure. Although the material
may be in possession of the state, any testimony offered by the defendant
should be for the limited purposes of that proceeding only and inad-
missible in any subsequent proceeding arising out of the seizure.
The requirement in Metzger and Tyrone that a copy of the illegally
seized film be made available to the prosecution for the preparation
and trial of the action, and the suggestion in Bethview that a subpoena
335 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
383 Id. at 394.
337 Id. at 393-94 (footnotes omitted).
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duces tecum be utilized for the same purpose, are unrealistic in light of
the foregoing discussion. It is illogical to say that the state may obtain
by court order that which it cannot obtain without a prior adversary
hearing. If it could, the appropriate procedure would never be invoked.
Moreover the same principles which operate to preclude such produc-
tion at the trial stage are also applicable to the pre-trial stage. The only
conceivable use of the material is for an analysis which would be intro-
duced into evidence by the state to establish the defendant's guilt. It
is equally incongruous to advance the theory that compulsory produc-
tion at this level is not contrary to the spirit of the Fifth Amendment.
Some federal decisions have stated that an adversary proceeding must
not only be conducted prior to seizure, but to arrest as well.3"" Such a
suggestion is highly unusual and controversial. Others assume the
contrary, more traditional posture.33 9 This conflict presents a difficult
and somewhat delicate problem. Prior discussion has focused upon the
chilling effect and impact upon public access exerted by seizure of al-
legedly obscene material, whereas in the area of arrest the problem is the
seizure of the individual who possesses the material. The former con-
cerns interference with commercial freedom, the latter with personal
freedom. There seems little doubt that such an arrest may create an
ultimate "chilling" of public access, since the threat of incarceration
with its attendant expense might well deter individuals from exercising
these rights. If mixed questions of constitutional law and fact are
presented which preclude the magistrate from making an ex parte de-
termination of probable cause for seizure of material, elementary logic
compels the conclusion that this must also preclude the seizure of an
individual. However, tempering logic with practical considerations, it
would be quite absurd in any other area of suspected criminal conduct
to require law enforcement officials to contact a suspect and request his
voluntary appearance before a magistrate to discuss whether or not he
should be arrested. So long as the exercise of First Amendment rights
in this area involves potential criminal proceedings this virtually in-
soluble conflict will exist.
V. REs JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A. Background and Development
The obscenity prosecution generally involves multiple prosecutions
338 City News Center, Inc. v. Carson, 310 F. Supp. 1018 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Delta
Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969) (3 judge court).
339 Milky Way Productions, Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
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concerning the same material within a given jurisdiction. Thus, the
potential for harrassment of an individual presents substantial problems
and a framework within which the concepts of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel may be operative.3 40  What is to many the best known and
most frequently used expression of the concepts, and the distinction to
be drawn is found in Cromwell v. County of Sac:
341
[TrMhe judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar
to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in con-
troversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to
every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose. . . . Such demand or claim, hav-
ing passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation be-
tween the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever.
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a dif-
ferent claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an
estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon
the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.
342
Res judicata operates to preclude parties from relitigating identical is-
sues arising from the same transaction in a proceeding subsequent to
one in which final determination has been rendered as to those issues.
The concept of collateral estoppel differs from that of res judicata in that
a different cause of action is pursued. Those issues previously deter-
mined, which are again controverted, may not be relitigated by one
upon whom such determination is binding. The rule has been stated
as follows:
Where collateral estoppel is involved between the same parties as
those to the original suit the one who claims its benefit (proponent)
must show that the very fact or point now in issue was, in the former ac-
tion, (1) litigated by the parties; (2) determined by the tribunal; and
(3) necessarily so determined.3 43
Although most commonly utilized in the area of civil litigation, the
(3 judge court), a!f'd, 397 U.S. 98 (1970); Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301 F. Supp. 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
340 See F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROcEDURE 549-610 (1965); Currie, Mutuality of
Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957); Note,
Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818 (1952). It should be
noted that these concepts are applicable to civil actions concerning allegedly obscene
matter.
341 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 351 (1876); see F. JAMES, JR., supra note 340, at 549-52.
342 94 U.S. (4 Otto) at 352-53; contra, CAL. VEIL CODE ANN. § 40834 (West 1968).
343 F. JAMES, JR., supra note 340, at 576 (footnote omitted).
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application of the concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel to
criminal actions is no longer subject to question. In what is consid-
ered to be the landmark decision extending these principles to the area
of criminal law, United States v. Oppenheimer,344 the reasoning of an
earlier English decision 41 was adopted:
Where a criminal charge has been adjudicated upon by a court having
jurisdiction to hear and determine it, the adjudication, whether it takes
the form of an acquittal or conviction, is final as to the matter so ad-
judicated upon, and may be pleaded in bar to any subsequent prosecu-
tion for the same offence. . . . In this respect the criminal law is in
unison with that which prevails in civil proceedings.
3 46
The earlier decisions stated the requirement that the "same parties"
were requisite to the application of these principles. This approach,
termed "mutuality", has been the subject of increasing controversy in
recent years, with federal and state decisions in conflict. 347  California
rejected the mutuality requirement as to who may assert the plea in
Bernhard v. Bank of America:1
48
No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement
of mutuality. . . . Many courts have abandoned the requirement...
and confined the requirement of privity to the party against whom the
plea of res judicata is asserted . . . . The cases justify this excep-
tion on the ground that it would be unjust to permit one who has
had his day in court to reopen identical issues by merely switching ad-
versaries.
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three questions
are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical
with the one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judg-
ment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted
a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?3 49
More recently, a federal court in United States v. United Air Lines,
Inc.350 relying upon Bernhard, held:
While it is true that the general rule requires that there be identity
of parties to invoke the doctrine of res judicata, nevertheless, the
Courts, increasingly so in the last 20 years, have not adhered to that doc-
344 242 U.S. 85 (1916). See also Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 445 (1886).
345 242 U.S. at 88, quoting the Queen v. Miles, 24 Q.B.D. 423, 431 (1890).
346 Id.
347 Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. Rav. 25, 38-46 (1965);
see also F. JAMES, JR., supra note 340, at 603-10.
348 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
349 Id. at 812-13, 122 P.2d at 895. See also Teitlebaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion
Ins. Co., Ltd., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962).
350 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962) (Civil).
[Vol. 4
SELECTED PROBLEMS IN OBSCENITY
trine, and have held that no constitutional right is violated where the
thing to be litigated was actually litigated in a previous suit, final
judgment entered, and the party against whom the doctrine is to be in-
voked had full opportunity to litigate the matter and did actually litigate
it.3 5 1
Whether mutuality is requisite to interposing such a plea in a criminal
action has also been the subject of some doubt. However, it seems this
doubt may well have been laid to rest in Ashe v. Swenson,152 wherein
the Court states as a "rule of federal law":
[I]t is much too late to suggest that this principle [collateral estoppel]
is not fully applicable to a former judgment in a criminal case, either
because of lack of "mutuality" or because the judgment may reflect only
a belief that the Government had not met the higher burden of proof
exacted in such cases for the Government's evidence as a whole al-
though not necessarily as to every link in the chain.3 53
As the decision infers, the question has arisen in both criminal and civil
proceedings whether the ultimate determination of a fact may be used
as conclusive of some intermediate step in establishing this fact.354 It
is significant to note that the literal import of the preceding may well be
to establish as a "rule of federal law", that the ultimate determination of
a fact is of necessity conclusive as to those intermediate facts necessary
to establish that ultimate fact. Phrased differently, in a subsequent ac-
tion the final determination of a fact may be raised as conclusive of all
subordinate facts by which it is established, thereby estopping their reliti-
gation as well. In the obscenity prosecution, where all elements must
coalesce for the material to be deemed obscene, 355 there are no inter-
mediate facts and this problem will not arise.
Ashe is of further significance in that it elevates the concept of col-
lateral estoppel to constitutional dimensions:
[I]f collateral estoppel is embodied in [the Fifth Amendment's guar-
antee against double jeopardy], then its applicability in a particular
case is no longer a matter to be left for state court determination within
the broad bounds of "fundamental fairness," but a matter of constitu-
tional fact we must decide through an examination of the entire rec-
ord.
.,- * *
The ultimate question to be determined, then, in the light of Benton
351 Id. at 725-26.
352 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
353 Id. at 443, quoting United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1961).
354 397 U.S. at 443-44.
355 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
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v. Maryland, . . . is whether this established rule of federal law is
embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
We do not hesitate to hold that it is. For whatever else that constitu-
tional guarantee may embrace, it surely protects a man who has been
acquitted from having to "run the gantlet" a second time.35"
The question of whether a prior judgment was rendered upon a gen-
eral or special verdict may be critical in applying the concepts of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. In determining whether the issue de-
cided in the prior proceeding is identical with that under consideration
in the later case, the court must ascertain what was determined within
the confines of the first judgment and then consider its application to the
case at bar.357  If a special verdict has been rendered this task is not
particularly burdensome since the issues are specifically stated and de-
cided. However, where the prior proceeding involved a jury trial re-
sulting in a general verdict, the court asked to apply either concept must
look beyond the verdict to determine the underlying basis for the jury's
finding. In Sealfon v. United States,3 58 the defendant had been acquitted
on federal conspiracy charges in a jury trial and was subsequently tried
and convicted of the substantive offense. Defendant attempted to quash
the indictment in the second proceeding alleging res judicata, and upon
refusal of the lower court to entertain the motion, the United States Su-
preme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court
adopted the principle that res judicata is applicable to criminal proceed-
ings "and operates to conclude those matters in issue which the verdict
determined though the offenses be different." 5 ' Although the Court
framed its discussion in terms of res judicata, it seems that the issue was
one of collateral estoppel. The issue determinative of application of
the concept was stated to be
[w]hether the jury's verdict in the conspiracy trial was a determination
favorable to petitioner of the facts essential to conviction of the sub-
stantive offense. . . .depends upon the facts adduced at each trial and
the instructions under which the jury arrived at its verdict at the first
trial.
The instructions under which the verdict was rendered, however, must
be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circum-
stances of the proceedings.3 60
356 397 U.S. at 442-43, 445-46 (citations and footnote omitted).
357 289 F.2d at 913-14.
358 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
359 Id. at 578.
360 Id. at 578-79.
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Since the identical material was necessary for a conviction of either of-
fense, the Court found this evidence to be "the core of the prosecutor's
case""' in both instances, and the concept of collateral estoppel, al-
though framed in terms of res judicata, was applied to bar the second
prosecution.
More recently the Court in Ashe elaborated upon the factors to be
considered when viewing the issues determined within the framework
of a general verdict vis-h-vis collateral estoppel in a second criminal
action:
Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general
verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to "ex-
amine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the plead-
ings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether
a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than
that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration." The
inquiry "must be set in a practical frame, and viewed with an eye to all
the circumstances of the proceedings." Any test more technically
restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of
collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where
the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.362
It is apparent that the classification of general as opposed to special
verdict will not itself be determinative of the question of whether the
rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel will be applicable. Atten-
tion must now be focused upon a determination of that point in time at
which the judicial determination becomes "final".
The constituent elements of a final judgment seem somewhat elusive,
with decisional law primarily concerned with finality for purposes of ap-
peal.363  Finality for appeal differs significantly from the requisite fi-
nality for application of the concepts of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel in the obscenity prosecution.364 Generally, during the pendency of
361 Id. at 580.
362 397 U.S. at 444 (citation and footnotes omitted).
363 Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937); Loring v. Ilsley, 1 Cal. 24 (1850);
Belt v. Davis, 1 Cal. 134 (1850); 3 CAL. JrR. 2d Appeal and Error §§ 39-40 (1952).
364 An excellent discussion of the conflict concerning finality may be found in
United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 718-25 (D. Nev. 1962)
(Civil) and Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 984, 994-1010 (1950). The federal courts, and a
majority of jurisdictions, consider a trial court determination of issues of fact final for
purposes of these concepts unless review is by way of a trial de novo. 216 F. Supp. at
723-25. The issue of obscenity, being a matter of constitutional judgment, must be
determined de novo. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Obscenity is
peculiarly susceptible to "suspension of finality" in California due to the decision in
Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963), wherein
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appellate consideration, there is no "finality" sufficient to invoke these
concepts. To qualify as final for purposes of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, a judgment on the merits must have withstood scrutiny through-
out the appellate process or, alternatively, the parties have permitted
their respective appeal rights to lapse.
It must be noted that the statement that the identical issue raised has
been the subject of a final judicial determination on the merits in a court
of competent jurisdiction estops a party bound thereby from relitigating
that issue in a subsequent proceeding, is subject to qualification. Of
course, if the issue involved is not identical to that previously determined,
the plea may not be successfully interposed. Further, should there be a
substantial change in the controlling circumstances which led to the prior
determination, the plea may not be available. 36  Finally, application of
either concept in criminal matters is further tempered due to the re-
luctance on the part of the courts to arbitrarily hinder effective law en-
forcement, in contravention of public policy."' 6
B. Applicability to Obscenity Prosecutions
The obscenity prosecution, as a genre, is somewhat of a procedural
hybrid. It is neither solely in rem nor solely in personam, nor can it be
said to be quasi in rem. It is, rather, a combination of both in rem and
in personam, with the in rem aspect functioning as the threshold issue
determinative of whether subsequent in personam proceedings shall be
pursued.367  The common thread permeating all prosecutions is the
term "obscene". Any proceeding must, therefore, determine the char-
the court held that not only was the issue of obscenity a matter of constitutional
judgment for the court, rather than the jury, but that it was a matter for "independent
examination" on appeal regardless of the trial court's determination. Id. at 909-11, 383
P.2d at 157-58, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06; cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
235 (1963).
365 See United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 241-42 (1924), quoting New Orleans v.
Citizens' Bank, 167 U.S. 371, 396 (1897):
The estoppel resulting from the thing adjudicated does not depend upon whether
there is the same demand in both cases, but exists, even although there be
different demands, when the question upon which the recovery of the second de-
mand depends has under identical circumstances and conditions been previously
concluded by a judgment.. . . (emphasis added).
Compare Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 338 (1957) with Developments, supra
note 340, at 844-45.
366 See F. JAMES, JR., supra note 340, at 605.
367 The initial determination of the issue of obscenity is generally undertaken in a
proceeding designed to "focus searchingly" solely upon that issue. If the ultimate deter-
mination is favorable to the prosecution, thereby deeming the material contraband and
subject to forfeit (see note 374 infra), it will usually be the basis for an in personam
criminal proceeding against the distributor; but if the material is held to be within the
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acter of the material presented prior to consideration of any other requi-
site element, as the presence or lack thereof is meaningless should the
material be deemed protected. The nature of the material, and the ma-
terial itself, therefore, are the sine qua non of the proceeding, the very
core of the prosecutor's case. Since further consideration of the con-
cepts must be undertaken within a reasonably defined framework,
specific attention will be directed to California.
Assuming the appellate procedure has been exhausted, the tribunal
determining the issue of obscenity will be an appellate court; however,
should no appeal be taken the "final determination on the merits" will
have been rendered by an inferior court. 38  The standard to be ap-
plied is enunciated by In re Giannini 9 to be "a community comprised
of the entire State of California. ' 370  Applying the rules of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, the net effect of permitting an inferior court de-
cision to become binding is to extend the jurisdiction of such court to
the entire statewide community. This seems to follow since, as previ-
ously noted, the threshold issue in an obscenity prosecution is an essen-
tially in rem determination of the character of the material. The ma-
terial itself is the subject of the proceeding. The result is the final ju-
dicial determination of the nature of the material involved, with both the
material and the People of the State as parties to the action in a court of
competent jurisdiction. In any subsequent proceeding, the potential
effect of the application of the concepts of res judicata and collateral
estoppel is devastating.
Assume that X county undertakes, in the name of the People of the
State, prosecution of A for violation of the obscenity laws, the threshold
issue being the obscene nature of certain material. The trial court de-
termines, on the merits, that the material falls within First Amendment
guarantees, applying the statewide standard, and the People do not pur-
sue their appeal rights, if any, permitting this determination to become
final. Of course, any further proceeding against this same defendant
concerning the identical material is barred by the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against double jeopardy. Should "People of the State" in
Y county, or in any number of such judicial districts, subsequently
purview of the First Amendment guarantees, further action will be precluded. The
"pandering" aspect of distribution discussed in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966) is not within the scope of this article.
368 The majority of obscenity prosecutions, being misdemeanors, are adjudicated in
the municipal court. See CAL. P N. CODE ANN. § 1462 (West 1970).
36 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968).
370 Id. at 580, 446 P.2d at 547, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
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initiate proceedings involving the identical material, against a different
defendant, the threshold issue must again be that of obscenity. This
defendant, although not charged in the prior proceeding, may avail
himself of the concept of collateral estoppel. The issue of obscentity
concerning this material was the identical issue presented in the prior
adjudication; that adjudication was final "on the merits"; and the party
against whom this adjudication is raised was a party to the prior ad-
judication.
The foregoing is susceptible to challenge on two separate grounds, pre-
viously mentioned as qualifications to the concept of collateral estoppel.
The first concerns timeliness. Should the subsequent action be ini-
tiated at a point in time sufficiently distant from that of the prior ad-
judication, the People might successfully interpose the argument that
the controlling circumstance in the prior adjuciation has undergone a
substantial change. That circumstance is the statewide community
standard. Competent expert evidence 371 that the statewide community
standard had undergone substantial change during the intervening
period would be sufficient, if believed, to preclude an estoppel. The
second, and more nebulous rebuttal, is the assertion that a ruling favor-
able to the defense would constitute an arbitrary hindrance to effective
law enforcement. While both assertions combined might buttress each
other in a marginal situation, this assertion alone would seem weak, at
best. One of the cornerstones of the concepts of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel is the presumption that a decision on the merits of a
claim is the product of a comprehensive presentation of all matters perti-
nent to that decision. As the "People" were a party to the prior action,
undeniably representing their interest in effective law enforcement, so
in the subsequent proceeding do they represent this identical interest.
An assertion to the effect that this interest was not adequately and fully
litigated at the prior proceeding, if allowed, would effectively emascu-
late the concept.
The People may also wish to avail themselves of the concepts of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. Assume the previous factual setting,
however the People of the State prevail as to the issue of obscenity and
defendant A is convicted in X county. When the defense does not under-
take an appeal, the inferior court's determination becomes "final" in
the requisite sense. The material, deemed obscene, is now contraband
371 The requisite degree of proof is intentionally not discussed. However, it is
reasonable to assume that the burden in the prior proceeding concerning the standard's
initial existence will be that which the proponent of alleged change must bear upon
assertion of such change.
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and will be forfeit. 3 7 2 Subsequently, the People undertake prosecution of
defendant B in Y county, or any number of defendants in numerous coun-
ties, concerning the identical material. The threshold issue is again the
obscene nature of the identical material. The People may attempt to
raise the prior adjudication on this element as the subsequent action(s)
concerns the identical issue; there is a final adjudication on the merits
by a court of competent jurisdiction; and the party against whom the
adjudication is raised, the material, was a party to the prior adjudication.
Affirmative use of the concepts by the People would, of course, be sub-
ject to the same potential infirmity mentioned in the previous section, Le.,
substantial change in the controlling circumstance of the statewide com-
munity standard. Were these concepts operative in a vacuum of pure
theory, independent of other considerations, the foregoing would seem
to permit the prosecution's utilization of these concepts in subsequent
proceedings. However, to permit such affirmative use of the concepts
by the prosecution would affront one of the fundamental guarantees of
the Bill of Rights-the right of confrontation.
373
This guarantee was held applicable to the states in Pointer v. Texas.
374
Under the instant facts, the People, through utilization of the prior
in rem judgment of obscenity would, if permitted, supply the sine
qua non of the in personam criminal proceedings merely by pleading
that judgment and interposing the plea of collateral estoppel in answer
to any defense attempt to litigate the issue of obscenity. The ultimate
effect of such application would be to confront the defense with the
core of the prosecutor's case, in documentary form with no provision
for cross-examination or confrontation. Such procedures were early
condemned indeed, were deemed of primary importance in the enactment
of the Sixth Amendment.
375
In relation to the concept of collateral estoppel, in a criminal pro-
ceeding, courts have been quite reluctant to allow its application in a
372 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 312 (West 1970). Should the material be deemed
obscene, yet no conviction ensue, the material is nonetheless forfeit. See Aday v.
Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 789, 800, 362 P.2d 47, 54, 13 Cal. Rptr. 415, 422 (1961);
Barnard v. Municipal Court, 142 Cal. App. 2d 324, 327-28, 298 P.2d 679, 681-82
(1956).
373 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. This would equally be true should the prosecution of a
defendant be undertaken in other judicial districts.
374 380 U.S. 400 (1965); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 80 U.S. 415 (1965).
375 In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), the Court stated:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the ac-
cused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the con-
science of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury
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manner adverse to the defendant. This reluctance is admirably pre-
sented in what may be considered the two leading cases in the field.
United States v. Carlisi 76 stated the principle to be:
In transplanting the doctrine . . . to criminal law. . . . [a] prior
adjudication with respect to an element of a subsequently tried offense
is not binding upon the accused. This is so because the defendant,
charged with crime, always has the right to have the jury or the triers
of the facts determine anew every element of guilt.3 77
United States v. De Angelo 378 emphatically restated the foregoing:
An accused is constitutionally entitled to a trial de novo of the facts al-
leged and offered in support of each offense charged against him and to
a jury's independent finding with respect thereto.379
While the foregoing decisions considered the applicability of the concept
in the realm of a subsequent prosecution of the defendant in a prior ac-
tion, the rationale precluding application if negative to the defendant is
even more compelling in proceedings directed against an individual not
an actual party to a prior proceeding, the results of which compel him to
defend an in personam criminal proceeding.
The California procedures available to a defendant in an obscenity
prosecution offer two levels prior to trial at which the requisite final
judicial determination of the obscenity issue may be available. The first
is the 1538.5 motion for suppression and return of the material wherein
both parties have a right of appeal from an adverse ruling. Should an
appeal be taken by either party and the defense prevail upon the issue of
obscenity, it seems this determination might be raised in a subsequent
proceeding concerning the identical material, by way of estoppel. The
net effect of such determination is that probable cause to believe the ma-
terial obscene did not exist. The other level is at the pre-trial stage of
the proceedings. The appellate remedy available to the adverse party
at this level is by way of petition for a writ of prohibition or mandate.
In the event the defense prevails upon the issue of obscenity, this de-
termination would bear the requisite finality to estop future proceedings
concerning the identical material. The foregoing are subject to the
in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 418-19, citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
But cf. United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Cal. 1959); People v.
Majado, 22 Cal. App. 2d 323, 70 P.2d 1015 (1937). Cf. United States v. De Angelo,
138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943); United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
376 32 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
377 Id. at 482.
378 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943).
379 Id. at 468.
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same qualifying factors as a final determination at the trial level.
An ancillary problem exists, arguably within the arbitrary hindrance
of effective law enforcement qualification to the application of these
concepts. Recent years have witnessed an attempt to discourage "forum
shopping"38 0 and establish a modicum of uniformity in the area of civil
litigation. The potential impact of the concepts of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel in obscenity prosecutions is to promote "forum shop-
ping" among the judicial districts of the state of the rankest sort. It
may be stated that the disseminator chooses the forum within which the
matter will be determined. Any prosecution will be undertaken within
the jurisdiction in which the individual transacts his business. While
the foregoing may seem elementary, there is an inherent weakness in
any strict or formalistic application of these concepts. The law in Cali-
fornia as it presently exists not only encourages the disseminator to se-
lect the most liberal jurisdiction available should he contemplate prose-
cution concerning marginal material, but also permits, under the cir-
cumstances previously discussed, an inferior court in that jurisdiction to
determine the issue of obscenity for the entire state. The potential for
abuse is particularly evident in light of the recent decision in Ashe ele-
vating these concepts to constitutional dimensions.
VI. EPILOGUE
This article has attempted to discuss, in some detail, three limited
areas of the First Amendment and the law concerning obscenity. Per-
haps no other area of constitutional law is changing so rapidly, with fed-
eral and state courts groping for effective means by which to balance
the substantial government interest of protecting the public good with
the fundamental individual rights involved. Permeating their efforts
to strike this delicate balance is an awareness that a misstep may result
in censorship of the sort this nation sought to ban at its formation.
The interpretation of that which is "obscene" is a relatively new con-
cept on the judicial scene and determining what is meant by the term
has eluded courts throughout the nation. One court noted:
This particular aspect of constitutional law is so much in the "still de-
veloping" stage that between June 24, 1957, the date of Roth. . .and
April 22, 1968, the members of the Supreme Court have written fifty-
five separate opinions in thirteen cases on the subject of obscenity and
have not been able to agree upon what it is or how to cope with it.381
380 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
381 Carter v. Gautier, 305 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (M.D. Ga. 1969).
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As the struggle continues to define what may be the indefinable,88 2 cer-
tain basic concepts which have been enumerated throughout this article,
must be borne in mind. Courts must remain aware of the delicate and
sensitive nature of the First Amendment rights involved and the fine
line which separates protected from unprotected speech. Any proce-
dure invoked must "focus searchingly" upon the issue of obscenity and
provide for a speedy judicial determination so as to avoid an imper-
missible prior restraint on dissemination and infringement upon Fifth
Amendment privileges. Their vigilance, far from crippling effective law
enforcement as some have urged, is in the finest tradition of American
jurisprudence ever wary of encroachment upon individual liberty.
POSTSCRIPT
On February 18, 1971, People v. Luros8 3 was decided by the
Supreme Court of California holding, inter alia, that evidence of con-
temporary community standards was not required to establish probable
cause sufficient to sustain an indictment for an alleged 1966 conspiracy
to violate obscenity laws. Luros is only tenable if limited strictly to
its facts as a local community standard was applied at the time of the
indictment. In post-Giannini proceedings, Luros would not control
since the standard is a statutory element of the conclusion "obscene"
and Giannini requires a statewide community. Competent evidence
of this element must be introduced 38 4 in light of the Luros majority
reliance upon an earlier case stating an indictment will be invalid if
"there is a total absence of evidence supporting a necessary element of
the crime charged. ' 385  Parenthetically, it seems Giannini is not to be
given retrospective application.
82 Contra, United States v. 11Y4 Dozen Packages of Article Labeled in part
Mrs. Moffat's Shoo Fly Powders for Drunkenness, 40 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1941),
relying upon United States v. 23%2 Dozen Bottles, 35-Cent Size, and 12% Dozen
Bottles, 70-Cent Size, of an Article of Drugs Labeled in Part "Lee's Save the Baby",
44 F.2d 831 (D. Conn. 1930).
383 Crim. No. 13153 (filed Feb. 18, 1971).
384 See pp. 16-18 supra.
385 People v. Aday, 226 Cal. App. 2d 520, 527, 38 Cal. Rptr. 199, 204 (1964).
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